Whether the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725,contravenes constitutional principles of federalism.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioners are the Attorney General of the United States and the UnitedStates of America.
Respondents are the Attorney General for the State of South Carolina, theState of South Carolina, the South Carolina Press Association, the VirginiaPress Association, the West Virginia Press Association, the Maryland/Delaware/Districtof Columbia Press Association, the Newspaper Association of America, andthe American Society of Newspaper Editors.







In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1998

No. 98-1464
JANET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

CHARLIE CONDON, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Attorney General of the United Statesand the United States, respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari toreview the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the FourthCircuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a-37a) is reported at155 F.3d 453. The opinion of the district court (App., infra, 38a-72a) isreported at 972 F. Supp. 977.

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on September 3, 1998. Apetition for rehearing was denied on December 22, 1998. App., infra, 73a-74a.The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
1. The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section8, Clause 3, provides: "The Congress shall have Power * * * To regulateCommerce * * * among the several States."

2. The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Thepowers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibitedby it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to thepeople."

3. The Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, isreprinted in an appendix to this petition (App., infra, 75a-81a).

1. This case involves a constitutional challenge brought by the State ofSouth Carolina to the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), 18U.S.C. 2721-2725, which restricts disclosure of personal information fromstate motor vehicle records.1 An individual who seeks a driver's licensefrom his State's department of motor vehicles (DMV) is generally requiredto give the state agency a range of personal information, including thedriver's name, address, telephone number, and in some cases medical informationthat may bear on the driver's ability to operate a motor vehicle. In someStates, the DMV also requires a driver to provide his social security numberand takes a photograph of the driver. State DMVs, in turn, routinely sellthis personal information to individuals and businesses.2 Although DMVsgenerally charge only a small fee for each particular sale of information,aggregate revenues are substantial. For example, New York's motor vehicledepartment earned $17 million in one year from individuals and businessesthat used the State's computers to examine driver's license records. See1994 WL 212813 (Feb. 3, 1994) (statement of Janlori Goldman, American CivilLiberties Union).
The personal information sold by DMVs is also used extensively to supportthe marketing efforts of corporations and database compilers. See 1994 WL212836 (Feb. 3, 1994) (statement of Richard A. Barton, Direct MarketingAssociation) ("The names and addresses of vehicle owners, in combinationwith information about the vehicles they own, are absolutely essential tothe marketing efforts of the nation's automotive industry."). Thisinformation "is combined with information from other sources and usedto create lists for selective marketing use by businesses, charities, andpolitical candidates." Ibid. See also 1994 WL 212834 (Feb. 3, 1994)(statement of Dr. Mary J. Culnan, Georgetown University) (describing useof DMV information by direct marketers).
The highly publicized 1989 murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer brought tolight the potential threat to privacy and safety posed by this commercein motor vehicle record information. Schaeffer had taken pains to ensurethat her address and phone number were not publicly listed. Despite thoseprecautions, a stalker was able to track her down by obtaining her homeaddress through her state motor vehicle records. See 140 Cong. Rec. H2522(daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Rep. Moran). Evidence gathered byCongress revealed that that incident was similar to many other crimes inwhich stalkers, robbers, and assailants had used state motor vehicle recordsto locate, threaten, and harm victims.3
Moreover, Congress received evidence indicating that a national solutionwas warranted to address the problem of potentially dangerous disclosuresof personal information in motor vehicle records. Marshall Rickert, MotorVehicle Administrator for the State of Maryland, who testified in supportof the legislation on behalf of the American Association of Motor VehicleAdministrators, emphasized that technological advances had dramaticallyincreased the accessibility of state motor vehicle records, but that "manystate laws have not kept pace with technological advancements, and permitvirtually unlimited public access to driver and motor vehicle records."1994 WL 212696 (Feb. 4, 1994). Accordingly, he urged that "uniformnational standards are needed." Ibid. In addition, among the incidentsbrought to Congress's attention were ones in which stalkers had followedtheir victims across state lines. See 1994 WL 212822 (Feb. 3, 1994) (statementof David Beatty, National Victim Center).

2. Based on evidence about threats to individuals' privacy and safety frommisuse of personal information in state motor vehicle records, Congressenacted the DPPA to restrict the disclosure of personal information in suchrecords without the consent of the individual to whom the information pertains.The DPPA does not require any affirmative act by state motor vehicle agencies.4Rather, it simply prohibits any state DMV, or officer or employee thereof,from "knowingly disclos[ing] or otherwise mak[ing] available to anyperson or entity personal information about any individual obtained by thedepartment in connection with a motor vehicle record." 18 U.S.C. 2721(a).5The DPPA defines "personal information" as any information "thatidentifies an individual, including an individual's photograph, social securitynumber, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digitzip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information,"but not "information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, anddriver's status." 18 U.S.C. 2725(3).
The DPPA bars only nonconsensual disclosures. Thus, DMVs may release personalinformation for any use, if they provide individuals with an opportunityto "opt-out" from disclosure when they receive or renew theirlicenses. See 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(11). In addition, a DMV may release personalinformation about an individual to a requester if the department obtainsconsent to the disclosure from the individual to whom the information pertains.See 18 U.S.C. 2721(d). A DMV also may disclose information about an individualif the requester has that individual's written consent. 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(13).
The DPPA explicitly disclaims any restriction on the use of motor vehicleinformation by "any government agency," including a court, andalso "any private person or entity acting on behalf of a Federal, State,or local agency in carrying out its functions." 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(1).It also expressly permits DMVs to disclose personal information for anystate-authorized purpose relating to the operation of a motor vehicle orpublic safety. 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(14).
The DPPA does not preclude States from disclosing personal information forother uses in which Congress found an important public interest. Thus, Statesmay disclose personal information in their motor vehicle records for usein connection with car safety or theft, driver safety, and other motor-vehiclerelated matters, 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(2); by a business to verify the accuracyof personal information submitted to that business, and further to preventfraud or to pursue legal remedies if the information the individual submittedto the business is revealed to have been inaccurate, 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(3);in connection with court, agency, or self-regulatory body proceedings, 18U.S.C. 2721(b)(4); for research purposes, if the personal information isnot further disclosed or used to contact the individuals, 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(5);by insurers in connection with claims investigations, anti-fraud activities,rating, or underwriting, 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(6); to notify owners of towedor impounded vehicles, 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(7); by licensed private investigativeagencies or security services for permitted purposes, 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(8);by employers to verify information relating to a holder of a commercialdriver's license, 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(9); for use in connection with privatetollways, 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(10); and in certain circumstances for bulk distributionfor surveys, marketing, or solicitation, if individuals are provided anopportunity, "in a clear and conspicuous manner," to prohibitsuch use of information pertaining to them, 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(12).
The DPPA also regulates the resale and redisclosure of personal informationobtained from state DMVs, 18 U.S.C. 2721(c), and prohibits any person fromknowingly obtaining or disclosing any record for a use not permitted bythe DPPA, or providing false information to a state agency to circumventthe DPPA's restrictions on disclosure, 18 U.S.C. 2722(a). The States haveno obligation themselves to regulate the use of information obtained underthe Act or to pursue legal remedies against any requester who obtains oruses information in violation of the Act.
Finally, the DPPA sets forth penalties and civil remedies for knowing violationsof the Act. Any "person" (defined to exclude any State or stateagency) who knowingly violates the DPPA may be subject to a criminal fine.18 U.S.C. 2723(a), 2725(2). A state agency that maintains "a policyor practice of substantial noncompliance" with the DPPA may be subjectto a civil penalty imposed by the Attorney General of not more than $5000per day for each day of substantial noncompliance. 18 U.S.C. 2723(b). Anyperson who knowingly obtains, discloses, or uses information from a statemotor vehicle record for a use not permitted by the DPPA may also be subjectto liability in a civil action brought by the person to whom the informationpertains. 18 U.S.C. 2724.

3. South Carolina law provides that the Motor Vehicle Division of the Departmentof Public Safety will release information contained in its motor vehiclerecords to anyone, provided that the requester fills out a form listinghis name and address and stating that the information will not be used fortelephone solicitation. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 56-3-510 to 56-3-540(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998). The Department of Public Safety is authorizedto charge a fee for the release of requested information. Id. § 56-3-530.Accordingly, South Carolina law appears to permit disclosures for uses broaderthan those permitted by the DPPA.
South Carolina brought this action in federal district court, alleging thatthe DPPA exceeds Congress's constitutional powers, and seeking an injunctionagainst enforcement of the DPPA. The district court granted summary judgmentfor the State and entered a permanent injunction against the Act's enforcement.App., infra, 39a-40a.
The district court ruled that this case was controlled by New York v. UnitedStates, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).The district court found the DPPA similar to the federal statutes invalidatedin New York and Printz because, it believed, "[i]n enacting the DPPA,Congress has chosen not to assume responsibility directly for the disseminationand use of these motor vehicle records. Instead, Congress has commandedthe States to implement federal policy by requiring them to regulate thedissemination and use of these records." App., infra, 53a.6

4. a. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed. App., infra, 1a-37a.The majority did not express doubt that disclosure and use of personal informationheld by state DMVs could be considered "commerce" within the scopeof Congress's regulatory power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3. The court noted, however, that Congress"is constrained in the exercise of that [commerce] power by the TenthAmendment. Thus, the question * * * is not whether the DPPA regulates commerce,but whether it is consistent with the system of dual sovereignty establishedby the Constitution." App., infra, 8a.
The majority acknowledged that "the DPPA is different in several respectsfrom the statutes struck down in New York and Printz." App., infra,14a. "Unlike the federal statute in New York, the DPPA does not commandeerthe state legislative process. In particular, the DPPA does not requirethe States to enact legislation regulating the disclosure of personal informationcontained in their motor vehicle records." Ibid. Further, the courtrecognized that, unlike the statute invalidated in Printz, "the DPPAdoes not conscript state officers to enforce the regulations establishedby Congress. Indeed, the DPPA does not require that state officials reportor arrest violators of the DPPA." Ibid. The court nonetheless concludedthat "state officials must * * * administer the DPPA," and statedthat New York and Printz had made "perfectly clear that the FederalGovernment may not require State officials to administer a federal regulatoryprogram." Ibid. It rejected the government's contention that New Yorkand Printz govern only the situation where the federal law in question "requiresa State to regulate the behavior of its citizens." Id. at 15a.
Even on the assumption that the government's reading of New York and Printzwas correct, however, and that the DPPA does not require the States to regulatethe behavior of its citizens, the court still found the DPPA unconstitutional.The majority rejected the government's contention that the DPPA could besustained under cases such as Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which upheld federal regulation of activitiesof the States affecting commerce. It believed that Garcia established abroad limit on Congress's power to regulate state activity: "UnderGarcia and its progeny, Congress may only 'subject state governments togenerally applicable laws.'" App., infra, 15a (quoting New York, 505U.S. at 160). Under the court's reading of Garcia, that decision did notgovern this case because the DPPA by definition can apply only to stateagencies:
[T]he DPPA exclusively regulates the disclosure of information containedin state motor vehicle records. Of course, there is no private counterpartto a state Department of Motor Vehicles. Private parties simply do not issuedrivers' licenses or prohibit the use of unregistered motor vehicles. Thus,rather than enacting a law of general applicability that incidentally appliesto the States, Congress enacted a law that, for all intents and purposes,applies only to the States.
App., infra, 17a.
The panel recognized that other federal statutes prevent private partiesfrom disclosing personal information in various circumstances. App., infra,18a. It regarded that point as irrelevant, however, because, even thoughCongress had regulated similar activity by private citizens in other federalstatutes, it had not regulated private citizens' use and disclosure of personalinformation in the DPPA itself:
Under Garcia, a statute is constitutional only if it is generally applicable.A law is not generally applicable simply because it could be generally applicable.That Congress could subject private parties to the same type of regulationis irrelevant to the Tenth Amendment. Congress may invade the sovereigntyof the States only when it actually enacts a law of general applicability.Nothing short of that will pass constitutional muster.
Ibid.7
b. Judge Phillips dissented. He concluded that the Commerce Clause providesa sufficient constitutional basis for Congress's authority to enact theDPPA. App., infra, 27a-37a. Judge Phillips stressed that "the end objectof the [DPPA] is the direct regulation of state conduct[,] * * * not theindirect regulation of private conduct * * * by forcing the states directlyto regulate that conduct." Id. at 29a. He concluded this "directregulation of State activity * * * distinguishes the DPPA, in the most fundamentalof ways, from the federal legislation struck down respectively in New Yorkand Printz." Id. at 30a.
Judge Phillips also contested the majority's reading of Garcia as limitingcongressional power to situations in which Congress subjects state conductto laws of general applicability. App., infra, 31a-32a. Although Judge Phillipsnoted that the statutes upheld in Garcia and similar cases, such as EEOCv. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), were laws of general applicability, inthat they regulated activities of both state and private actors, he explainedthat those laws were held constitutional "not so much--if at all--becausethey applied equally to state and private actors as because they directlyregulated state activities rather than using the 'States as implements ofregulation' of third parties." App., infra, 32a (quoting New York,505 U.S. at 161). And, he suggested, the DPPA "does nothing differentfrom, for example, that done by federal regulation of municipal sewage andstate-owned solid waste disposal systems," or "federal regulationof state-owned liquor monopolies or lottery facilities. Surely it is nobasis for invalidating such regulations that no private equivalent couldbe found in the particular area of regulation." Id. at 36a, 37a.
c. The panel denied the government's petition for rehearing, and the fullcourt denied the government's suggestion of rehearing en banc by a voteof seven to six. App., infra, 73a-74a.

Certiorari is warranted in this case to review "the exercise of thegrave power of annulling an Act of Congress." United States v. Gainey,380 U.S. 63, 65 (1965). The Fourth Circuit has invalidated the Driver'sPrivacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA) on its face, as violative of the constitutionalstructure of federalism. Moreover, the court of appeals' decision conflictsdirectly with the decisions of two other courts of appeals that have upheldthe DPPA and have expressly rejected the Fourth Circuit's analysis. Travisv. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998); Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d1266 (10th Cir. 1998).8 In addition, the Fourth Circuit's articulation ofthe limits on congressional power under the Commerce Clause to regulatestate activity is erroneous and may have far-reaching implications for othercongressional efforts to regulate commercial activity in which States engage.Review by this Court is therefore warranted.
1. In several fields, Congress has identified a problem in the disseminationof, and commerce in, personal information without the consent of the individualto whom the information pertains, and has acted to restrict and regulatesuch disclosure and commerce. In the context of information held by privateenterprises, Congress has enacted statutes that restrict nonconsensual disclosuresof personal information held by video stores, cable television companies,credit bureaus, and electronic communications services.9 Congress has alsorestricted disclosures of personal information by the federal government.10In much the same way, the DPPA regulates the disclosure of personal informationby state DMVs.11
There can be no serious dispute that personal information held by stateagencies and sold to requesters or made available to requesters for furtheruse in interstate commerce is a proper subject of regulation pursuant toCongress's power under the Commerce Clause. Indeed, the court of appealsdid not suggest otherwise. The sale of information by state DMVs generatessignificant revenues for the States and is integral to the operations ofthe national direct marketing industry. See pp. 3-4, supra; Travis, 163F.3d at 1002. Such information is therefore legitimately subject to federalregulation as a "thing[] in interstate commerce," and its disseminationis also legitimately subject to Congress's Commerce Clause power as an activity"having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." See UnitedStates v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558, 559 (1995); see also Garcia v. San AntonioMetro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538 (1985); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S.226, 235-236 (1983).
The court of appeals nonetheless concluded that, under constitutional principlesof federalism, Congress may not employ its power under the Commerce Clauseto regulate state activity in or affecting commerce unless that regulationis effected pursuant to a "law of general applicability," i.e.,a single statute that applies both to state activity and also to essentiallyidentical activity undertaken by private enterprises. App., infra, 18a.The court drew this supposed rule from this Court's decision in Garcia,which it read to establish that "Congress may only subject state governmentsto generally applicable laws." Id. at 15a (internal quotation marksomitted). This Court's decisions, however, establish no such principle.
This Court has held that it is permissible for Congress to regulate activityin or affecting commerce undertaken by the States in circumstances whereCongress has also regulated similar activity undertaken by private enterprises.See, e.g., Garcia, supra; EEOC v. Wyoming, supra. The reason why such anexercise of congressional power is permissible, however, is not that insuch cases Congress has simultaneously addressed activity undertaken byboth state and private actors. Nor has it anything to do with the formalstructure of the law passed by Congress-namely, that Congress enacted regulationof both private and state activity in the same piece of legislation ratherthan in separate laws. Rather, the exercise of congressional authority toregulate state activity in or affecting commerce is permissible because,by its nature, it does not impinge on the residual sovereignty that theStates retain under the Constitution. As Judge Phillips explained, the statuteschallenged in Garcia and Wyoming were upheld "because they directlyregulated state activities rather than using the 'States as implements ofregulation' of third parties." App., infra, 32a (quoting New York v.United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992)). Those statutes were thereforefound to be consistent with the system of dual sovereignty established bythe Constitution, which "authorizes Congress to regulate interstatecommerce directly," including activities undertaken by state agenciesthat are in or that affect interstate commerce, even if "it does notauthorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstatecommerce." New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
The same is true where (as here) Congress regulates state activity in oraffecting commerce under a law directed only at that particular activity.Congress might decide that a particular danger affecting interstate commercearises from the sale or dissemination of information held only in the handsof state agencies; or it might decide that the danger, although roughlyanalogous to a similar danger posed by misuse of information in privatehands, is sufficiently different that it should be addressed in a statutedesigned for and directed at the matter at hand. The Commerce Clause doesnot require Congress to impose blanket regulations governing the disseminationand sale of personal information in all sectors, nor does it deny to Congressthe flexibility of addressing the concerns raised by such disclosures andsales on a sector-by-sector basis, including giving consideration to whateverfactors might weigh in favor of particular exemptions in particular contextswarranting disclosure. Whatever underlay Congress's decision in the DPPAto address disclosures and sales of personal information by state agenciesseparately, that decision does not somehow render Congress's otherwise unobjectionableregulation of commerce improper. It remains true that, when Congress directlyregulates an activity in or affecting interstate commerce undertaken bya state agency, it regulates commerce, not the State's regulation of commerce.As the Seventh Circuit observed, the DPPA "affects states as ownersof databases; it does not affect them in their role as governments."Travis, 163 F.3d at 1004.

2. This Court's decisions also establish that Congress may not "command[eer]"the States either by requiring them "to enact or enforce a federalregulatory program" or by "conscripting the States' officers directly"in the enforcement of federal law. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,935 (1997); see New York, 505 U.S. at 188. The court of appeals acknowledgedthat the DPPA requires neither that the States enact legislation nor thatstate officials arrest or report violators of the DPPA; rather, the DPPAis enforced entirely through civil penalties and criminal fines sought bythe federal government, and through civil causes of action brought againstindividuals. App., infra, 14a. Nonetheless, the lower court suggested thatstate officials must "administer the DPPA," and that the DPPAtherefore runs afoul of the Court's holdings in New York and Printz that"the Federal Government may not require State officials to administera federal regulatory program." Ibid. That reading of New York and Printzis incorrect, and the lower court's decision on that point is directly contraryto this Court's decision in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
When the Court in New York gave force to the constitutional rule that Congressmay not "commandeer" the States, it explained that, under thesystem of dual sovereignty, "the Constitution has never been understoodto confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern accordingto Congress' instructions." 505 U.S. at 161, 162. The DPPA, however,does not "commandeer" the States' governmental authority in thatway. To the contrary, the DPPA "directly regulates the disclosure of[the specified] information," and it makes enforcement "the jobof federal officials." Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1272; accord Travis, 163F.3d at 1005 ("Wisconsin is no more a regulator or law enforcer whenit decides what information to release from its database than is the cornerBlockbuster Video outlet [when it complies with the Video Privacy ProtectionAct of 1988]."); App., infra, 29a (Phillips, J., dissenting) ("theend object of the Act is the direct regulation of state conduct" ratherthan "the indirect regulation of private conduct"); cf. Baker,485 U.S. at 514 (the statute "regulates state activities; it does not* * * seek to control or influence the manner in which States regulate privateparties").
State officials may, of course, have to take administrative steps to bringtheir agencies into compliance with the DPPA. The Court has made clear,however, that the necessity of taking such steps to ensure that the Statesconform to federal law does not amount to "commandeering" of stategovernments in contravention of the Constitution. As the Court explainedin South Carolina v. Baker: "That a State wishing to engage in certainactivity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to complywith federal standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that presentsno constitutional defect." 485 U.S. at 514-515. Indeed, if taking administrativesteps to ensure compliance with federal law amounted to the forbidden "commandeering,"then the Court's decision in Garcia, upholding the application of the FairLabor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. (FLSA) to state employment,would be a nullity, "for the FLSA requires states to establish record-keepingsystems and to establish mechanisms for paying employees according to anational formula. Every federal law that affects the way states participatein the marketplace may do the same." Travis, 163 F.3d at 1003-1004.
Moreover, the DPPA in no way interferes with a State's ability to collectinformation from its citizens or to use that information for motor vehicle-relatedor other governmental purposes. See 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(1) and (14). Also,"[n]othing in the [DPPA] interferes with states' ability to licensedrivers and remove dangerous ones from the road." Travis, 163 F.3dat 1003; accord Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1272 ("The DPPA neither limitsa state's ability to regulate in the field of automobile licensing and registration* * * nor restricts a state's ability to use motor vehicle information inits own regulatory activities."). And, far from imposing affirmativeobligations on States, the DPPA simply imposes reasonable federal restrictionson the exercise of state authority. The DPPA thus effectively operates topreempt state law insofar as that state law may allow dissemination of personalinformation by DMVs in a manner inconsistent with federal law. The systemof dual sovereignty established by the Constitution does not prohibit Congressfrom preempting state law in that manner. See New York, 505 U.S. at 167-168,173-174; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.264, 290 (1981).

3. Congress enacted the DPPA after receiving evidence that disclosure ofinformation from motor vehicle records had on numerous occasions led toserious, and indeed fatal, threats to individuals' safety. In addition,Congress understood that motor vehicle records are perhaps unique because(1) they constitute a single database, compiled by the States as a conditionof engaging in an important function-driving-which unquestionably affectscommerce and which is, in practical effect, a necessity of modern life,and (2) because they can be connected to license plates, which the Statesrequire individuals to display in public whenever they drive. Thus, theunique concern that Congress found here arises from the fact that individualsare effectively forced to advertise the key to their personal informationon their license plate when they drive. As Representative Moran, one ofthe Act's sponsors, explained: "The key difference between DMV recordsand other public records comes from the license plate, through which everyvehicle on the public highways can be linked to a specific individual. Anyonewith access to data linking license plates with vehicle ownership has theability to ascertain the name and address of the person who owns that vehicle.Other public records are not vulnerable to abuse in the same way."140 Cong. Rec. H2523 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994).
Congress therefore had an ample basis on which to conclude that abuse ofmotor vehicle records to obtain individuals' personal information for nefariouspurposes posed a sufficient threat to individuals' personal safety and autonomy,such that the exercise of its power under the Commerce Clause was legitimate.See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819) ("Letthe end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, andall means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,which are not prohibited, but consist with letter and spirit of the constitution,are constitutional."). And as the district court observed, South Carolinahas offered no state interest in favor of unqualified disclosure of personalinformation in motor vehicle records to place in the balance against theprivacy interest that Congress has identified as warranting protection.App., infra, 67a.
In sum, the DPPA is a wholly proper regulation of interstate commerce thatdoes not impinge on any aspect of state sovereignty protected by the Constitution.Because the court of appeals has held that Act of Congress unconstitutionalin a decision that conflicts with rulings of other courts of appeals, reviewby this Court is warranted.

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.