1. This case involves an Establishment Clause challenge to the application,in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, of a federal program that provides financialassistance to local educational agencies (LEAs) for education-improvementprograms, and authorizes LEAs receiving federal financial assistance tolend instructional equipment, instructional materials, and library materialspurchased with that assistance to private elementary and secondary schools,including religious schools, as part of a program that neutrally benefitsstudents in public and private schools. The application of a related stateprogram was also challenged. The federal program at issue here was substantiallyamended twice during the course of this litigation and has had several titles;it is currently found at Title VI of the Elementary and Secondary EducationAct of 1965 (ESEA), Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 55, as amended by the ImprovingAmerica's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, §§ 6001-6403,108 Stat. 3707-3716. See 20 U.S.C. 7301-7373. For simplicity we will referto the federal program as "Title VI"; previous decisions in thiscase referred to it as "Chapter 2."1
Title VI authorizes financial assistance to LEAs and to state educationalagencies (SEAs) to implement nine kinds of "innovative assistance"programs. See 20 U.S.C. 7351(a) and (b); see also Charter School ExpansionAct of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-278, § 2(2), 112 Stat. 2682. Among thekinds of programs that may be implemented with Title VI funds are programs"for the acquisition and use of instructional and educational materials,including library services and materials (including media materials), assessments,reference materials, computer software and hardware for instructional use,and other curricular materials which are tied to high academic standardsand which will be used to improve student achievement and which are partof an overall education reform program." 20 U.S.C. 7351(b)(2). As pertinenthere, LEAs may use Title VI funds to purchase computer hardware and softwarefor instructional use; they may also use such funds to acquire supplementalinstructional materials and library materials.2
Title VI requires that LEAs ensure that children enrolled in private nonprofitschools (as well as those in public schools) have the opportunity to benefitfrom programs financed with Title VI assistance. See 20 U.S.C. 7312, 7372.Moreover, Title VI expenditures by LEAs for private schoolchildren must"be equal (consistent with the number of children to be served) toexpenditures * * * for children enrolled in the public schools of the [LEA],taking into account the needs of the individual children and other factorswhich relate to such expenditures." 20 U.S.C. 7372(b).
Any benefit provided to children in private schools, however, must be secular,and must not take the place of any services, equipment, or materials thatthe private school would offer or obtain in the absence of federal assistance.Thus, Section 7372 expressly provides that LEAs "shall provide forthe benefit of such children in such [private] schools secular, neutral,and nonideological services, materials, and equipment." 20 U.S.C. 7372(a)(1)(emphasis added); see also 20 U.S.C. 8897 ("Nothing contained in thischapter shall be construed to authorize the making of any payment underthis chapter for religious worship or instruction."). Title VI alsorequires that the control of all Title VI funds "and title to materials,equipment, and property * * * shall be in a public agency * * * and a publicagency shall administer such funds and property." 20 U.S.C. 7372(c)(1).In addition, any services provided for the benefit of private school studentsmust be provided by "a public agency" or by a contractor who,"in the provision of such services, is independent of such privateschool and of any religious organizations." 20 U.S.C. 7372(c)(2). Further,Title VI funds for innovative-assistance programs must supplement, and inno case supplant, the level of funds that, in the absence of Title VI funds,would be made available for those programs from "non-Federal sources."20 U.S.C. 7371(b).
An LEA that wishes to receive federal funds for a Title VI program mustpresent an application to the pertinent SEA. The SEA is required to certifythe LEA's application for funds if the application explains the plannedallocation of funds among the nine kinds of programs permitted under thestatute, sets forth the allocation of funds required to assure the equitableparticipation of private schoolchildren, and provides assurance of compliancewith the statute's various requirements, including the requirement of participationof private schoolchildren in secular benefits under the program. 20 U.S.C.7353(a)(1)(A)-(B) and (3). The LEA must also agree to keep records sufficientto permit the SEA to evaluate the LEA's implementation of the program. 20U.S.C. 7353(a)(4). The statute does not provide for review by the Departmentof Education of the LEA's application for Title VI funds.
The Department of Education's Title VI regulations emphasize the statute'slimitations on assistance that may be provided to children at private schools.Those regulations explain that services obtained with federal funds mustsupplement, and not supplant, services that the private schools would otherwiseprovide their schoolchildren, 34 C.F.R. 299.8(a), and that the LEA mustkeep title to all property and equipment used for the benefit of privateschoolchildren, 34 C.F.R. 299.9(a). In addition, the regulations requirethat the public agency "ensure that the equipment and supplies placedin a private school * * * [a]re used only for proper purposes of the program."34 C.F.R. 299.9(c). As explained below, the Department has recently issuedfurther guidance for LEAs on the participation of private schoolchildrenin Title VI, addressing in particular procedures that LEAs should follow,and safeguards that LEAs should impose, to ensure that Title VI benefitsafforded to private schoolchildren are secular. See pp. 15-16, infra.

2. In Louisiana, the State Bureau of Consolidated Educational Programs administersthe Louisiana Title VI program. After Louisiana receives its Title VI fundsfrom the federal government, the SEA allocates 80% of the funds to LEAs.Eighty-five percent of those funds is allocated to LEAs based on the numberof participating elementary and secondary school students in both publicand private schools, and 15% is allocated based on the number of childrenfrom low-income families. Pet. App. 86a.3
For the school year 1984-1985 (immediately before this lawsuit was commenced),the Jefferson Parish Public School System (JPPSS) received $655,671 in TitleVI funds. Approximately 70% of that money ($456,097) was used for equipment,materials, and services at public schools in the JPPSS, and the remainingamount ($199,574) was used for Title VI programs provided to students atprivate schools in the district. Pet. App. 86a. For the school year 1986-1987,the JPPSS received $661,148 in Title VI assistance. Approximately 32% ofthat amount ($214,080) was used to provide Title VI benefits to privateschoolchildren in the district. Of the $214,080 budgeted for private schoolchildren,$94,758 was spent to provide library and media materials, and $102,862 wasspent for instructional equipment. Id. at 90a. With respect to the Stateof Louisiana as a whole, about 25% of the total Title VI allotment was usedfor children in private schools. Id. at 86a.
The State of Louisiana, in administering Title VI, "never transmitsdollars to [any] non-public school." Pet. App. 87a (brackets in originalomitted). Moreover, because the statute requires that a public authorityretain title to all Title VI equipment and materials, such resources areprovided only on loan to private schools, and the ultimate authority andcontrol over those items always rests with the public school system, notthe private schools. Ibid.
The SEA and the LEA monitor the use of Title VI equipment and materialsin private schools to determine whether they are used for purposes consistentwith Title VI, including the requirement that they be used only for secularpurposes. Title VI Guidelines issued by the Louisiana SEA emphasize to theLEAs that "the LEA must ensure that [Title VI] equipment and materials* * * are used for secular, neutral and non-ideological purposes."Gov't Exh. D-4 in Opp. to Resp. Mot. for Summ. Judg. (State Guidelines)22. The State Guidelines suggest that LEA representatives visit each privateschool site at least yearly and check the materials ordered to ensure thatthey are secular, neutral, and nonideological. Ibid. Representatives ofthe SEA visit each LEA every two years to monitor the LEA's implementationof the Title VI program, including the LEA's compliance with statutory requirements.Pet. App. 56a. In those monitoring visits, the SEA representatives examinewhether the services, material, and equipment provided to private schoolsare secular, neutral, and nonideological. State Guidelines 22. In addition,the SEA encourages LEAs to have religious schools sign written assurancesthat Title VI equipment will not be used for religious purposes. Id. at84; Pet. App. 87a. The JPPSS has also required signed assurances from eachprivate school that material and equipment would be used in "directcompliance" with Title VI. Woodward Dep. Exh. 13; see Pet. App. 107a.
The record compiled below showed that, in Jefferson Parish, Ruth Woodward,the coordinator of Title VI programs in the JPPSS, notifies private schoolseach year of the allotment of Title VI funds available for services to studentsat those schools; those notices are accompanied by a reminder from the Directorof the SEA that Title VI prohibits the acquisition of religiously orientedmaterial. Woodward Dep. 62-63 & Exh. 3. Woodward also visits each privateschool every year to discuss use of the Title VI equipment with a schoolofficial, such as the principal or a librarian, and to make sure that logsof use of Title VI equipment are kept, and that Title VI equipment is properlymarked as such. Id. at 96-98, 102-103, 111. Woodward specifically inquiresof private school officials whether the Title VI equipment and materialsare used for secular, neutral, and nonideological purposes. Id. at 102,111. Library books purchased for loan to private schools are personallyapproved by Woodward and another public school official from catalogues;they also personally review all requests by private schools for librarybooks and other instructional materials, such as videocassettes and filmstrips,and delete titles that might indicate religiously oriented materials. Id.at 38, 88-89; Pet. App. 57a.4

3. On December 2, 1985, plaintiffs Mary Helms, Amy Helms, and Marie Schneider(hereafter respondents) brought suit in district court against federal,state, and local officials, claiming that several federal, state, and localprograms as applied in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, including Title VI,violated the Establishment Clause.5 Respondents did not challenge TitleVI on its face. Rather, they contended that one provision, authorizing federalfunds to be used for the purchase of instructional equipment and materials,had been unconstitutionally applied in the Parish because such equipmentand materials had been "transferred to nonpublic schools for theiruse." Second Amended Complaint ¶ 50 (Nov. 1, 1988). Respondentsargued that this loan of instructional equipment and materials to privateschools violated the Establishment Clause because (a) there were allegedlyno safeguards in place to prevent the property lent to the private schoolsfrom being used for religious purposes, and (b) any monitoring that wouldbe useful in preventing the use of instructional equipment for religiouspurposes would create an excessive entanglement between the government andprivate religious schools. Id. ¶ 52.
After discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment on the constitutionalityof the Title VI program in the Parish. In 1990, the district court initiallyconcluded that the program was unconstitutional, and granted summary judgmentto respondents on that issue. Pet. App. 137a-151a. The court concluded (id.at 148a-150a) that the practice of providing instructional equipment andmaterials to religious schools was controlled by this Court's decisionsin Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229(1977), and Public Funds for Public Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29(D.N.J. 1973), aff'd mem., 417 U.S. 961 (1974), which had invalidated stateprograms that provided instructional equipment and materials to religiousschools.
The government moved for reconsideration, and on January 28, 1997, the districtcourt reversed itself and upheld the Title VI program as applied in JeffersonParish. Pet. App. 82a-108a. The court relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit'sthen-recent decision in Walker v. San Francisco Unified School District,46 F.3d 1449 (1995), which upheld a "virtually indistinguishable"(Pet. App. 107a) Title VI program under which instructional equipment, includingcomputers, was lent to religious private schools. The court emphasized that,as in Walker, the instructional equipment and materials lent to the privateschools in Jefferson Parish were secular, that Title VI benefits were madeavailable to students on a neutral basis and without reference to religion,and that all the monitoring controls in effect in Walker were also in effectin Jefferson Parish: library books and other instructional materials areprescreened by the LEA; most parochial schools sign a pledge agreeing notto use the materials for religious purposes; an LEA official visits theprivate schools every year; the SEA also monitors the LEA's implementationof the program; and no Title VI money is ever paid directly to religiousschools. Ibid. In light of those factors, the court found that the TitleVI program in Jefferson Parish "does not have as its principal or primaryeffect the advancement or inhibition of religion." Id. at 108a.

4. Respondents appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The court of appeals reversed,and held that Jefferson Parish's Title VI program, insofar as it was appliedto provide instructional equipment and materials and library materials toreligious schools, was unconstitutional under this Court's decisions inMeek and Wolman. Pet. App. 53a-71a. The Fifth Circuit expressly disagreedwith the Ninth Circuit's Walker decision upholding "a [Title VI] programthat was, in all relevant respects, identical to the one * * * in JeffersonParish." Id. at 59a.
After examining this Court's decisions regarding aid to religious schoolsand students, particularly Meek, Wolman, Board of Education v. Allen, 392U.S. 236 (1968), and Committee for Public Education & Religious Libertyv. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980), the court of appeals concluded that thosedecisions "drew a series of boundary lines between constitutional andunconstitutional state aid to parochial schools, based on the characterof the aid itself." Pet. App. 66a. Whereas Allen had upheld the loanof textbooks to religious school students, Meek and Wolman, "whileboth reaffirming Allen, nevertheless invalidated state programs lendinginstructional materials other than textbooks to parochial schools and schoolchildren."Id. at 67a. The court of appeals also concluded that the "boundarylines" between permissible and impermissible assistance based entirelyon the character of the aid were reaffirmed by Regan, which upheld aid toreligious schools for the administration of standardized tests developedand required by the State, and which "clarified that Meek only invalidatesa particular kind of aid to parochial schools-the loan of instructionalmaterials." Id. at 68a.
The court rejected two arguments that these absolute "boundary lines"based on the character of the aid are inapplicable to this case. First,it concluded that the Ninth Circuit in Walker had erred in attempting todistinguish Meek and Wolman on the ground that the programs struck downin those cases "directly targeted massive aid to private schools, thevast majority of which were religiously-affiliated," whereas TitleVI is a "neutral, generally applicable statute that provides benefitsto all schools, of which the overwhelming beneficiaries are nonparochialschools." Pet. App. 69a (internal quotation marks omitted). That readingof Meek and Wolman was flawed, the court concluded, because the programsat issue in both cases were specifically designed to ensure that privateschoolchildren would benefit from educational benefits equivalent to thebenefits otherwise provided to public schoolchildren. Id. at 69a-70a.
Second, the court concluded that Meek and Wolman had not been called intoquestion by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), which upheld a federalprogram under which public school teachers provide supplemental instructionto religious school students at those students' schools. "Agostinidoes, it is true, discard a premise on which Meek relied-i.e., that 'substantialaid to the educational function of sectarian schools necessarily resultsin aid to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole.'" Pet. App. 70a(quoting Meek, 421 U.S. at 366) (emphasis added; brackets and ellipsis omitted).But, the court stated, Agostini "does not replace that assumption withthe opposite assumption; instead, Agostini only goes so far as to 'departfrom the rule that all government aid that directly aids the educationalfunction of religious schools is invalid.'" Ibid. (quoting Agostini,521 U.S. at 225) (brackets and ellipsis omitted). Agostini, the court concluded,"says nothing about the loan of instructional materials to parochialschools and we therefore do not read it as overruling Meek or Wolman."Ibid.
Applying Meek and Wolman to this case, the court then concluded that TitleVI was unconstitutional as applied in Jefferson Parish "to the extentthat [it] permits the loaning of educational or instructional equipmentto sectarian schools." Pet. App. 71a. The court's prohibitory decree"encompasses such items as filmstrip projectors, overhead projectors,television sets, motion picture projectors, video cassette recorders, videocamcorders, computers, printers, phonographs, slide projectors, etc."Ibid. The decree also "necessarily prohibits the furnishing [to suchschools] of library books by the State, even from prescreened lists."Ibid. The court could "see no way to distinguish library books fromthe 'periodicals . . . maps, charts, sound recordings, films, or any otherprinted and published materials of a similar nature' prohibited by Meek."Ibid. (quoting Meek, 421 U.S. at 355) (brackets omitted). "The SupremeCourt has only allowed the lending of free textbooks to parochial schools;the term 'textbook' has generally been defined by the case law as 'a bookwhich a pupil is required to use as a text for a semester or more in a particularclass he legally attends.' We do not think library books can be subsumedwithin that definition." Ibid. (quoting Allen, 392 U.S. at 239) (citationomitted).6

5. The government petitioned for rehearing and suggested rehearing en bancof the court of appeals' decision. Although one of the judges on the courtof appeals called for an en banc poll, the court denied both rehearing andrehearing en banc. Pet. App. 154a. The panel amended its decision, however,to make clear that the use of Title VI funds to provide textbooks to religiousschool students is not prohibited by its decree. Id. at 155a.

6. In February 1999, the Department of Education issued amended Guidancefor SEAs and LEAs on various aspects of Title VI, including the statutoryrequirement that all services, equipment, and materials made available toprivate school students be secular, neutral, and nonideological. See App.,infra, 1a-9a.7 The Guidance explains that LEAs "should implement safeguardsand procedures to ensure that Title VI funds are used properly for privateschool children." Id. at 4a. First, "it is critical that privateschool officials understand and agree to the limitations on the use of anyequipment and materials located in the private school." Ibid. To thatend,
LEAs should obtain from the appropriate private school official a writtenassurance that any equipment and materials placed in the private schoolwill be used only for secular, neutral and nonideological purposes; thatprivate school personnel will be informed as to these limitations; and thatthe equipment and materials will supplement, and in no case supplant, theequipment and materials that, in the absence of the Title VI program, wouldhave been made available for the participating students.
Ibid.
Second, the Guidance makes clear that the LEA "is responsible for ensuringthat any equipment and materials placed in the private school are used onlyfor proper purposes." App., infra, 4a. Thus, the LEA should "determinethat any Title VI materials * * * are secular, neutral and nonideological[,]* * * mark all equipment and materials purchased with Title VI funds sothat they are clearly identifiable as Title VI property of the LEA[, and]* * * perform periodic on-site monitoring of the use of the equipment andmaterials[,] * * * includ[ing] on-the-spot checks of the use of the equipmentand materials, discussions with private school officials, and a review ofany logs maintained." Id. at 4a-5a. The Guidance also states that theDepartment of Education believes that, to monitor compliance with the requirementsof Title VI, "it is a helpful practice for private schools to maintainlogs to document the use of Title VI equipment and materials located intheir schools." Id. at 4a. Furthermore, the Guidance emphasizes thatLEAs "need to ensure that if any violations occur, they are correctedat once. An LEA must remove materials and equipment from a private schoolimmediately if removal is needed to avoid an unauthorized use." Id.at 5a.

The court of appeals has read this Court's decisions in Meek v. Pittenger,421 U.S. 349 (1975), and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), to requireinvalidation of an Act of Congress, insofar as that statute has been appliedto authorize the loan of instructional equipment, instructional materials,and library materials for the benefit of religious school students. Moreover,the court of appeals held that invalidation of the program was compelledby the character of the aid alone, irrespective of whether the aid was accompaniedby safeguards with the purpose and effect of preventing the equipment andmaterials lent to religious schools from being diverted to religious purposes.That decision impairs the implementation of Title VI in the Fifth Circuit,and the decision's reasoning is likely to have similar adverse effects onother federal programs designed to ensure that all schoolchildren-includingthose in religious schools as well as public schools and private nonreligiousschools-have access to computers in their classrooms and school libraries.The court of appeals' decision also conflicts directly with a decision ofthe Ninth Circuit upholding a similar program. This Court's review is thereforewarranted.
Further, while Meek and Wolman may be read as the court of appeals readthem, we submit that neither the reasoning of those cases nor what thisCourt has identified as the fundamental principles of the EstablishmentClause necessarily requires a categorical rule prohibiting the loan of allinstructional equipment and materials to religious schools, without regardto whether the aid is accompanied by safeguards to prevent its diversionto religious purposes, or whether the aid is supplementary rather than adirect subsidy of the religious school's core educational program. The Courtshould therefore grant review to consider whether a categorical ban on lendingsecular instructional equipment and materials to religious schools shouldnot apply where (a) the aid is accompanied by safeguards adequate to protectagainst its diversion to religious purposes, (b) the aid is only supplementaryto the school's core educational functions, and (c) the aid provided tothe religious school is part of a program that serves all students in publicand nonprofit private schools, in a neutral and equitable fashion.
1. The court of appeals read this Court's decisions in Meek and Wolman asestablishing a categorical prohibition against lending instructional equipmentor materials or library materials purchased with public funds to religiousschools. The court of appeals therefore rejected the argument that suchloans of equipment and materials could be made if they supplemented, ratherthan supplanted, the basic educational function of the schools, and if safeguardswere established to prevent the diversion of the loaned materials to religiouspurposes.
Although that decision did not invalidate 20 U.S.C. 7351(b)(2) on its face,but rather held only that its particular application in Jefferson Parishwas unconstitutional, as a practical matter it impairs the effectivenessof Title VI in the Fifth Circuit, insofar as that statute requires thatreligious school students be permitted to participate equitably in its benefits.See 20 U.S.C. 7372(b). Title VI sets forth nine kinds of innovative-assistanceprograms that may be implemented with federal financial assistance. See20 U.S.C. 7351(b); Charter School Expansion Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-278,§ 2(2), 112 Stat. 2682. Experience has shown, however, that often theTitle VI program most useful for private schoolchildren is precisely thekind of program invalidated by the court of appeals in this case, fundedunder 20 U.S.C. 7351(b)(2), which permits the loan of instructional materialsand equipment, especially computer hardware and software, as well as librarymaterials.8 That sort of program also directly advances the important federalinterest in ensuring that all schoolchildren have access to new technologiesin instructional and library settings.9
The program at issue here provides for the loan of instructional equipmentand materials to the private school, for use by students there. Becauseof resource constraints, it is not feasible to provide this kind of assistanceby lending computers or software directly to each student, in a manner similarto the textbook-loan program upheld in Board of Education v. Allen, 392U.S. 236 (1968).10 Nor, for the same reason, is it feasible to hire publicschool teachers to supervise the use of Title VI instructional equipmentand materials by students at religious schools, so as to bring the programunder Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), which permits public schoolteachersto give instruction to religious school students in religious school buildings.11In practical effect, therefore, the court of appeals has invalidated a formof federal assistance that is highly relevant for private schoolchildren,and also central to the effort to bring modern technology to all students.
Thus, although the court of appeals' decision does not prohibit the Secretaryof Education from distributing funds under the statute to Louisiana forfurther distribution to LEAs in the State (including Jefferson Parish),it does restrict LEAs' ability to provide Title VI benefits to childrenwho attend religious schools. Under the court of appeals' ruling, LEAs mayfind it difficult to comply with the statutory requirement that they ensurethat private schoolchildren participate equitably in the benefits of TitleVI. See 20 U.S.C. 7372(a)(1). The adverse consequences of the court of appeals'decision for the equitable participation of children in religious schoolsin the benefits of Title VI warrant this Court's review.
In addition, the kind of assistance that the court of appeals has invalidatedis precisely the sort of assistance that will be even more important inthe future, in the effort to make computer-assisted learning available toall children. For example, we are informed that the President will shortlypropose a comprehensive revision of the ESEA that would establish a programspecifically designed to provide advanced computer technologies to students,including students in religious schools. See note 1, supra. Although thecourt of appeals' decision invalidates only a particular program under thecurrent Title VI, its reliance on Meek and Wolman for a broad ruling thatno instructional materials or equipment of any kind may be lent to religiousschools creates a serious question as to whether LEAs may continue to providecomputer hardware and software under either the current version of TitleIII, see 20 U.S.C. 6844(3), or the revision of it to be proposed by thePresident.

2. The court of appeals' decision conflicts directly with the Ninth Circuit'sdecision in Walker v. San Francisco Unified School District, 46 F.3d 1449(1995), which upheld a "virtually indistinguishable" Title VIprogram (Pet. App. 107a). In that case, as in this one, private schoolswere lent instructional equipment and materials, including computer equipment;the schools were also lent library books and instructional materials, selectedfrom prescreened lists to ensure their secularity. Ibid. The Ninth Circuitupheld the program, concluding in particular that it did not have the primaryeffect of advancing religion because the benefits under the program wereavailable on a neutral basis without reference to religion, and because"controls are in place to prevent [Title VI] benefits from being divertedto religious instruction." 46 F.3d at 1467.
The Ninth Circuit's decision is not distinguishable from the Fifth Circuit'sdecision in this case on the ground that the Ninth Circuit found that theSan Francisco program had adequate controls to prevent the diversion ofinstructional equipment to religious purposes.12 With one possible exception,those controls do not appear to have been significantly different from thecontrols in place in Jefferson Parish.13 Indeed, even though the court ofappeals in this case was aware that the program in Walker had in place variouscontrols, it found the two programs to be, "in all relevant respects,identical." Pet. App. 59a.
More importantly, under the court of appeals' rationale in this case, theexistence or extent of any such controls is simply irrelevant to the constitutionalquestion, for the Fifth Circuit read Meek and Wolman to hold that the permissibilityof aid to the educational function of a religious school is dependent entirelyon the nature of the aid. See Pet. App. 66a-67a. Thus, even if the JPPSSdid have in place controls equivalent to those examined in the Walker decision,or even more extensive controls giving even greater assurance that instructionalequipment would not be used for religious purposes, that would not haveaffected the court of appeals' resolution of this case. That conflict inthe circuits warrants resolution by this Court. LEAs and SEAs across theNation should know whether the Fifth Circuit's or the Ninth Circuit's decisionsets forth a correct understanding of the constitutional limits on theirability to comply with Title VI's requirement of equitable participationby private school students by lending computer hardware and software toreligious schools.

3. Meek and Wolman may fairly be read as the court of appeals read them,to prohibit flatly the loan of instructional equipment and materials foruse by students at religious schools, without regard to safeguards withthe purpose and effect of preventing such aid from being diverted to religiouspurposes. Such a broad categorical rule, however, appears unnecessary tosecure the "bedrock" Establishment Clause principle that "[p]ublicfunds may not be used to endorse [a] religious message." Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 846-847 (1995) (O'Connor,J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Bowen v. Kendrick,487 U.S. 589, 611 (1988) (Establishment Clause "prohibit[s] government-financedor government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particularreligious faith") (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 623 (O'Connor,J., concurring) ("any use of public funds to promote religious doctrinesviolates the Establishment Clause"); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ.& Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973) ("the State is constitutionallycompelled to assure that the state-supported activity is not being usedfor religious indoctrination"). Where the assistance is appropriatelylimited and safeguarded, we submit that the Constitution should not be readto demand a more sweeping restriction prohibiting all loans of such equipmentand materials to religious schools. Individual deviations from such safeguardsresulting in Establishment Clause violations can be redressed on a case-by-casebasis. Cf. Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 620-622 (opinion of the Court); id. at623-624 (O'Connor, J., concurring). It is not necessary, however, to adopta blanket presumption that such safeguards can never be effective or manageable.Cf. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.646, 662 (1980) ("[O]ur decisions have tended to avoid categoricalimperatives and absolutist approaches at either end of the range of possibleoutcomes."). Accordingly, we submit that the rule of Meek and Wolmanshould be limited to cases in which there is an unacceptable risk of diversionof resources to religious purposes-either because the public aid to a religiousschool is not supplementary, or because the provision of aid is not accompaniedby effective safeguards.14
To the extent that Meek and Wolman announce a categorical rule prohibitingloans of instructional equipment and materials to religious schools, thosedecisions rest on two rationales, both of which are subject to reexaminationin light of this Court's subsequent decisions. The first rationale is that,because religious elementary and secondary schools are typically consideredpervasively sectarian, any aid to the educational function of such schoolsmust be conclusively held to advance the religious as well as the secularaspects of the education that they provide, which are also deemed to beinextricably intertwined. See Meek, 421 U.S. at 364-366; Wolman, 433 U.S.at 249-251.
More recently, however, the Court has "departed from the rule * * *that all government aid that directly assists the educational function ofreligious schools is invalid." Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225. To be sure,the Agostini decision, and the decisions on which it relied for the above-quotedstatement (Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993),and Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)),involved the distinct situations of instructional assistance provided directlyto religious school students by public school personnel, and cash assistanceprovided directly to students (rather than religious schools) by publicauthorities. Nonetheless those decisions suggest a more nuanced rule thanthat announced in Meek and Wolman, so that loans of instructional equipmentand materials to religious schools should not conclusively be presumed toadvance the religious mission of such schools.15
Second, Meek and Wolman appear to rest also on the rationale that any safeguardsadequate to prevent the diversion of instructional equipment and materialsto religious purposes would require detailed supervision of religious schools'instruction, resulting in an impermissible entanglement between state andreligion. See Meek, 421 U.S. at 366-367 n.16 (discussing Public Funds forPublic Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd mem.,417 U.S. 961 (1974), and lower-court decision in Meek). But again, in latercases, including Agostini, the Court has indicated that the stringency ofits previous rules against interaction of public and religious institutionsshould be relaxed. Agostini observed that "[n]ot all entanglements* * * have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion," and that"[e]ntanglement must be 'excessive' before it runs afoul of the EstablishmentClause." 521 U.S. at 233 (also citing Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 615-617);see also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 430 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)("state efforts to ensure that public resources are used only for nonsectarianends should not in themselves serve to invalidate an otherwise valid statute").The danger of entanglement exists only where "pervasive monitoring,"see Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234, must be employed to prevent public aid frombeing diverted to religious purposes.
Thus, the question is not (as the court of appeals believed) whether thisCourt-having "discard[ed] a premise on which Meek relied-i.e., thatsubstantial aid to the educational function of sectarian schools necessarilyresults in aid to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole"-has "replace[d]that assumption with the opposite assumption," namely that aid to religiousschools is presumptively permissible. See Pet. App. 70a (internal quotationmarks, brackets, and ellipsis omitted). Rather, each case should be assessedon its facts. Direct material aid to religious schools would violate theEstablishment Clause if it were so extensive as to supplant resources thatthe school itself would otherwise provide or obtain, or if that aid werenot protected against diversion to religious use by adequate safeguards,or if it favored religious schools over secular schools. In this case, therefore,the court of appeals should have the opportunity to consider whether thestatutory limits on the uses to which Title VI aid may be put, togetherwith the actual safeguards put in place by the SEA and the LEA, are in factadequate to eliminate an unacceptable risk of diversion of resources tosectarian ends. The court of appeals also should have the opportunity toconsider the Department of Education's recent Title VI Guidance explainingthe kinds of safeguards that should be employed by LEAs administering TitleVI programs (see pp. 15-16, supra).16 And the court of appeals should thenconsider whether such safeguards, if adequate, are in fact so intrusivethat they inhibit the ability of religious schools to fulfill their religiousmission, or otherwise require "excessive and enduring entanglement."Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).17 But a categorical ban againstloans of instructional equipment and materials to religious schools in allcases does not appear necessary to prevent "government-financed orgovernment-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular religiousfaith." Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 611.
A further important point distinguishes Title VI from the assistance programsinvalidated in Meek and Wolman. Title VI expressly requires that any assistanceunder that program (whether for private or public schools) supplement, andnot supplant, non-federal resources available to the school-reflecting theinherently supplementary role the federal government plays in education.See 20 U.S.C. 7371(b); 34 C.F.R. 299.8(a). Moreover, the aid actually providedunder Title VI on a per-student basis is quite small, compared to the otherresources available to private schools. See p. 19 n.10, supra (appropriationof about $7 per student). The aid provided in Meek, by contrast, was describedby the Court as "massive" (421 U.S. at 365), and the extent ofthe aid in Wolman, although less clear from the Court's opinion in thatcase, appears to have been quite substantial as well. See 433 U.S. at 233($88 million biennial appropriation for auxiliary aid to nonpublic schools).
In Meek and Wolman, it was reasonable to conclude that the aid programs"relieved sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have bornein educating their students." Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12 (so characterizingMeek). By contrast, because of the anti- supplantation rule of Title VIand the relatively small amount of money spent per student, it would bedifficult to conclude that Title VI effects a "direct subsidy"to religious schools (ibid.), or that participation in the Title VI programpermits religious schools to divert other resources, which would otherwisebe used for secular purposes, to religious use. In addition, because TitleVI benefits are offered to all students on a neutral basis without referenceto religion, Title VI does not create "a financial incentive to undertakereligious indoctrination." Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231. Therefore, evenif there should be a categorical rule prohibiting loan of instructionalequipment and materials in some circumstances, it should be limited to situationswhere the aid program relieves religious schools of costs that they otherwisewould bear, which is not the case under Title VI.

The petitions for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.