Congress has defined supervised release as a term of a defendant's sentencethat is to run "after imprisonment," 18 U.S.C. 3583(a), not concurrentlywith imprisonment. Congress has further provided that a defendant's "termof supervised release commences on the day [he] is released from imprisonment"and "does not run during any period in which [he] is imprisoned [formore than 30 days] in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State,or local crime." 18 U.S.C. 3624(e). That clear statutory language meansthat a term of supervised release begins only on the date that the defendantis actually released from prison, not on the earlier date that the defendantwould have been released under a change in the law that had not yet beenannounced or applied to his case.

Congress's principal purpose in authorizing supervised release-"toease the defendant's transition into the community," S. Rep. No. 225,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1983)-would be frustrated if a defendant wasautomatically excused from all, or some portion, of his term of supervisedrelease because his term of incarceration was reduced to less than timeserved. Such defendants, as a class, are not in any less need of supervisionwhen they return to society than any other defendant. The additional timethat the defendant spent in prison was, in retrospect, unwarranted, butthat provides no per se assurance that his transition into the communitywill be any less problematic. As this Court has recognized in another context,community supervision (in that case, probation) and imprisonment "arenot fungible," because they are "fundamentally different in character."United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 46 (1994).

Congress has not left those in respondent's circumstances without any meansof seeking relief from a lengthy term of supervised release. Under 18 U.S.C.3583(e)(1), a district court may "terminate a term of supervised releaseand discharge the defendant released at any time after the expiration ofone year of supervised release * * * if it is satisfied that such actionis warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest ofjustice." In exercising that authority, a district court may take intoaccount that a defendant has served a period of incarceration for a subsequentlyoverturned conviction. In addition, a district court may "reduce"or "modify" the particular conditions of a defendant's term ofsupervised release "at any time." 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2). Especiallyin view of those alternative remedies, the court of appeals had no warrantto require that respondent's excess time in prison be credited against histime on supervised release.

Other statutory provisions confirm that Congress intended that a term ofsupervised release would begin only when the defendant actually walked outthe prison door. The provision authorizing the district courts to imposesupervised release as part of a defendant's sentence, 18 U.S.C. 3583, istitled "Inclusion of a term of supervised release after imprisonment"(emphasis added). The initial sentence of that provision states that "[t]hecourt, in imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for a felony ora misdemeanor, may include as a part of the sentence a requirement thatthe defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment."18 U.S.C. 3583(a) (emphasis added).6 The Senate Report on Section 3583 isin accord. See S. Rep. No. 225, supra, at 123 ("This section permitsthe court, in imposing a term of imprisonment for a felony or a misdemeanor,to include as part of the sentence a requirement that the defendant servea term of supervised release after he has served the term of imprisonment.")(emphasis added).

This Court has recognized that a term of supervised release is distinctfrom, and consecutive to, a term of incarceration. See Granderson, 511 U.S.at 50 (noting that "terms of supervised release * * * follow up prisonterms"); Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407 (1991) ("[s]upervisedrelease is a unique method of post-confinement supervision invented by theCongress"). So, too, has the United States Sentencing Commission, whichis charged with "establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices forthe Federal criminal justice system." 28 U.S.C. 991(b)(1). The SentencingCommission has prescribed that district courts "shall order a termof supervised release to follow imprisonment when a sentence of imprisonmentof more than one year is imposed, or when required by statute," and"may order a term of supervised release to follow imprisonment in anyother case." Sentencing Guidelines § 5D1.1 (emphases added).

The ordinary meaning of the term "release" confirms that a termof supervised release does not run while the defendant is still in prison.The word "release" is an antonym of the words "detention"and "imprisonment." See William D. Lutz, The Cambridge Thesaurusof American English 387 (1994) (release/detention); The Penguin Dictionaryof English Synonyms and Antonyms 344 (1992) (release/imprisonment); seealso Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms 690 (1942) ("release" isan antonym of "[d]etain (as a prisoner)"). In accordance withcommon English usage, then, a defendant cannot be both imprisoned and released(even with supervision) at the same time. Cf. Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50,57 (1995) (contrasting "release" and "detention" underthe bail reform provisions of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984);Hinckley v. United States, 163 F.3d 647, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (contrasting"release" and "confine" under a provision of the Districtof Columbia Code).

The court of appeals conceded (Pet. App. 4a) the force of the language ofSection 3624(e), but found a counterweight in Section 3624(a), which statesthat "[a] prisoner shall be released by the Bureau of Prisons on thedate of the expiration of [his] term of imprisonment." Contrary tothe court of appeals' reasoning, Section 3624(a) does not speak to the issuehere. It does not suggest that a defendant's term of imprisonment shouldbe deemed to "expir[e]" on any date other than the one dictatedby the sentence imposed by the district court. The court of appeals' constructionof Section 3624(a) implies that the Bureau of Prisons must continually assess,with respect to each prisoner in the federal system, whether the prisoneris entitled to an early release as a result of a new judicial decision orother change in the law. But Congress has left such determinations to thedistrict court that sentenced the prisoner. See 28 U.S.C. 2255; 18 U.S.C.3582(c).7

Congress has explicitly provided in other circumstances for a defendantto receive a "credit" against his sentence. For example, a prisoner"may receive credit toward the service of [his] sentence" of upto 54 days a year if the Bureau of Prisons determines that he "hasdisplayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations."18 U.S.C. 3624(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see also 18 U.S.C. 3585(b)(providing that "[a] defendant shall be given credit toward the serviceof a term of imprisonment" for certain "time he has spent in officialdetention prior to the date the sentence commences"). Such provisionsdemonstrate that, when Congress intends to allow a credit against a defendant'ssentence, Congress does so expressly. Congress did not do so with respectto the terms of supervised release of defendants who served time in prisonunder a sentence that is subsequently vacated. It would thus be particularlyunwarranted to construe Section 3624(a), or any other provision of the CriminalCode, as implicitly authorizing a credit for such defendants.

B. Congress's Principal Purpose In Authorizing Supervised Release-"ToEase The Defendant's Transition Into The Community"-Would Be UnderminedIf A Defendant's Excess Prison Time Automatically Reduced His Time On SupervisedRelease

The conclusion that a term of supervised release commences only when a defendantis actually released from prison accords with Congress's principal purposein establishing supervised release as a distinct component of a defendant'ssentence. The Senate Report explained that "the primary goal of sucha term is to ease the defendant's transition into the community after theservice of a long prison term for a particularly serious offense, or toprovide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a fairly short periodin prison for punishment or other purposes but still needs supervision andtraining programs after release." S. Rep. No. 225, supra, at 124. TheSenate Report added that supervised release was not designed to serve "thesentencing purposes of incapacitation and punishment." Ibid.; see alsoid. at 125 ("The term of supervised release * * * follows a term ofimprisonment and may not be imposed for purposes of punishment or incapacitationsince those purposes will have been served to the extent necessary by theterm of imprisonment."). Congress perceived that the goal of assistinga defendant's integration into the community was not adequately served underthe existing parole system, because a defendant was subject to supervisiononly if he was released from prison early by the Parole Commission, butnot if he remained incarcerated for the full term imposed by the districtcourt. Id. at 122-124. Congress thus intended that "[t]he term of supervisedrelease would be a separate part of the defendant's sentence, rather thanbeing the end of the term of imprisonment," so that whether, and towhat extent, a defendant would be subject to supervision would turn on theneeds of the defendant and the community, rather than "on the almostsheer accident of the amount of time that happens to remain of the termof imprisonment when the defendant is released." Id. at 123, 124.

Congress's purposes for authorizing supervised release are further reflectedin 18 U.S.C. 3583(c), which provides that a district court, in determiningwhether to impose a term of supervised release and the duration and conditionsof any such term, shall consider certain of the "factors to be consideredin imposing a sentence" enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Section 3583(c),as originally enacted in 1984, identified six of those factors: "thenature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristicsof the defendant," 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1); "the need * * * to affordadequate deterrence to criminal conduct," 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(B);"the need * * * to provide the defendant with needed educational orvocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in themost effective manner," 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(D); "the kinds ofsentences and the sentencing range established for * * * the applicablecategory of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant asset forth in the guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission," 18U.S.C. 3553(a)(4); "any pertinent policy statements issued by the SentencingCommission," 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(5); and "the need to avoid unwarrantedsentence disparities," 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6). § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat.1989-1990, 1999. Congress amended 18 U.S.C. 3585(c) in 1987 to require districtcourts to consider a seventh factor in the supervised release determination:"the need * * * to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,"18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(C). Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, §9, 101 Stat. 1267. Notably absent from the list of factors that Congresshas deemed relevant to the supervised release determination is 18 U.S.C.3553(a)(2)(A), "the need * * * to reflect the seriousness of the offense,to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense."See also Sentencing Guidelines § 5D1.1, comment. (n.1) (1998) (recognizingthat the purposes of supervised release include "to protect the publicwelfare," "to provide drug or alcohol treatment or testing,"and "to assist the reintegration of the defendant into the community").

Congress thus contemplated that supervised release would serve purposesdistinct from incarceration. It would aid a defendant in making his "transitioninto the community" after his release from prison-for example, by assistinghim in obtaining vocational training, medical treatment, or substance abusecounseling. See 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(D); Sentencing Guidelines § 5D1.3(enumerating mandatory and discretionary conditions of supervised release).It would at the same time provide a measure of security to the communityinto which the defendant is released by enabling the United States ProbationOffice to monitor him during the transition period. See 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(C).Those purposes cannot effectively be served until the defendant is livingin the community.

The mere fact that a defendant has served more time in prison than he wouldhave served, if a judicial decision affecting the validity of a portionof his sentence had been announced earlier, offers no assurance that histransition into the community will be any less difficult. To the contrary,as Congress recognized, a defendant who is returning to the community "afterthe service of a long prison term" may be particularly in need of supervision.S. Rep. No. 225, supra, at 124; cf. Harold B. Wooten, Violation of SupervisedRelease, 6 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 183 (1993) ("With longer periods ofincarceration come greater difficulties in reintegrating into communities.Social relationships must be built anew. Released offenders must find jobswhen market skills have passed them by for all but the most menial tasks.").The court of appeals' position would recreate, with respect to defendantsin respondent's position, a defect that Congress identified in the parolesystem and sought to eliminate with supervised release: that a defendant'speriod of supervision after his release from prison turned "on thealmost sheer accident of the amount of time that happens to remain of theterm of imprisonment when the defendant is released," rather than onthe needs of the defendant and the community. S. Rep. No. 225, supra, at124.

In sum, because Congress intended that incarceration and supervised releasewould serve different purposes, prison time cannot properly be treated asinterchangeable with time on supervised release. As the First Circuit hasexplained in reaching a result contrary to that of the Sixth Circuit inthis case:

[S]upervised release is intended to facilitate the integration of the violatorinto the community, while providing the supervision designed to limit furthercriminal conduct. Incarceration, to the contrary, does nothing to assista defendant's transition back into society and is not a reasonable substitutefor a portion of the supervised release term.

Joseph, 109 F.3d at 38-39 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).Indeed, this Court has reached a similar conclusion with respect to anotherform of community supervision, observing that "probation and imprisonmentare not fungible; they are sentences fundamentally different in character."Granderson, 511 U.S. at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted). So, too,terms of supervised release and terms of incarceration "are not fungible"because they are "fundamentally different in character."

C. Congress Has Provided A Different Avenue Of Relief For A Defendant WhoHas Been Incarcerated On A Subsequently Vacated Conviction

A person in respondent's position is not without a means of seeking relieffrom a lengthy term of supervised release. Under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(1), adistrict court may "terminate a term of supervised release and dischargethe defendant released at any time after the expiration of one year of supervisedrelease * * * if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conductof the defendant released and the interest of justice." As the FifthCircuit has suggested, in assessing whether a defendant's supervised releaseshould be terminated early in "the interest of justice," a districtcourt "may take into account the fact that a defendant served timeunder a wrongful conviction and sentence." United States v. Jeanes,150 F.3d 483, 485 (1998); accord Joseph, 109 F.3d at 39; cf. United Statesv. Spinelle, 41 F.3d 1056, 1060-1061 (6th Cir. 1994) (statute requiringa minimum term of supervised release does not preclude a district courtfrom exercising its authority under Section 3583(e)). A district court mayalso "modify" or "reduce" any condition of supervisedrelease "at any time prior to the expiration or termination of theterm of supervised release." 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2).

In a related context, the Sentencing Commission has indicated that discretionaryreduction of a term of supervised release under Section 3583(e), ratherthan automatic reduction or elimination of that term, is the proper responsewhen a defendant's term of imprisonment is reduced because of a retroactivelyapplied change in the law. The Sentencing Commission has provided that,in cases where a defendant has served more time in prison than would berequired under an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, the district courtcannot reduce the defendant's sentence to less than time served. SentencingGuidelines § 1B1.10(b). The court may, however, take the defendant'sexcess prison time into account as part of the totality of circumstancesbearing on whether to grant a motion for early termination of supervisedrelease under Section 3583(e)(1). Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.10, comment.(n.5). The Sentencing Commission also made clear that "the fact thata defendant may have served a longer term of imprisonment than the courtdetermines would have been appropriate in view of the amended guidelinerange shall not, without more, provide a basis for early termination ofsupervised release." Ibid.8

Although a defendant who has spent excess time in prison in connection withan invalidated sentence is not entitled to a credit against the time thathe still must serve on supervised release, he would be entitled to a creditagainst the time that he still must serve in prison in connection with anothersentence that was to run consecutively to the invalidated sentence. Thatis because "[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment ordered to run consecutivelyor concurrently shall be treated for administrative purposes as a single,aggregate term of imprisonment." 18 U.S.C. 3584(c). Respondent wasunable to take advantage of that mechanism because he had no additionalfederal prison time to serve. But that is no reason to undermine the functionof supervised release by automatically excusing those in respondent's circumstancesfrom all, or some portion, of their terms of supervised release.9

In sum, given that a defendant who has served excess time in prison as aresult of a subsequently invalidated conviction may obtain a reduction inhis term of supervised release, if the district court determines that sucha reduction is justified by the defendant's conduct and "the interestof justice," there is little equitable force to the court of appeals'position that such a defendant must receive a reduction in his term of supervisedrelease without regard for the needs of the defendant and the communityinto which he is released. No reason therefore exists to depart from theplain language of the statute, which states that a term of supervised releasebegins when the defendant is released from prison, and not while he remainsin federal, state, or local custody. 18 U.S.C. 3624(e).