Whether regulations adopted by the State of Washington governing staffingand operation of ocean-going oil tankers engaged in coastal and internationalcommerce are preempted to the extent that they conflict with internationalobligations of the United States and Coast Guard regulations for such tankerspromulgated pursuant to federal statutes and international conventions andagreements.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The petitioner in this proceeding is the United States of America, whichintervened in the case below. The case was originally brought by the InternationalAssociation of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) against various WashingtonState officials responsible for the promulgation and enforcement of theWashington regulations at issue here. Those officials are: Gary Locke, Governorof the State of Washington; Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General of theState of Washington; Barbara J. Herman, Administrator of the State of Washington,Office of Marine Safety; David MacEachern, Prosecutor of Whatcom County;K. Carl Long, Prosecutor of Skagit County; James H. Krider, Prosecutor ofSnohomish County; and Norman Maleng, Prosecutor of King County. The NaturalResources Defense Council, Washington Environmental Council, and Ocean Advocatesintervened in the district court.




In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1998

No. 98-1701
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
v.
GARY LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States, respectfully petitionsfor a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Courtof Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. 1a-35a)1 is reported at 148 F.3d1053. The court's order denying rehearing (App. 36a-54a) is reported at159 F.3d 1220. The opinion of the district court (App. 55a-89a) is reportedat 947 F. Supp. 1484.

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on June 18, 1998. A petitionfor rehearing was denied on November 24, 1998. App. 37a. On February 12,1999, Justice O'Connor granted an extension of time in which to file a petitionfor a writ of certiorari to and including March 24, 1999, and on March 15,1999, further extended the time in which to file to and including April23, 1999. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Pertinent provisions of the United States Constitution, Ports and WaterwaysSafety Act of 1972, Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Coast Guard regulations,and Washington State regulations are set forth in the appendix, at 90a-117a.

This case concerns the validity of a regulatory scheme adopted by the Stateof Washington that seeks to govern the equipment, design, staffing, andoperation of oil tankers engaged in interstate and foreign commerce. TheWashington regulations, which apply to all ships (including foreign-flagvessels) that transport oil through territorial waters, differ from thecomprehensive national and international standards developed for the samepurpose. Those standards have been codified in international conventionsformally ratified by the United States, other agreements with foreign nations,various Acts of Congress, and implementing regulations promulgated by theSecretary of Transportation through the Coast Guard.
1. a. The United States, through the Coast Guard and other federal agencies(such as the Departments of State and Defense, the Environmental ProtectionAgency, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), is a leaderin the development of consensual international standards establishing uniformrequirements for oil tankers, as well as other vessels. See S. Treaty Doc.No. 39, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. at III (1994) ("The United States hasbasic and enduring national interests in the oceans and has consistentlytaken the view that the full range of these interests is best protectedthrough a widely accepted international framework governing uses of thesea."). The international regime, embodied in numerous conventionsratified by the United States, depends upon the principle of reciprocity:all signatory nations are assured of a ship's compliance with internationalstandards through the certification of the ship by the government of itsown flag nation, and that certification is then respected by the other signatorynations, including the United States.2
Congress has enacted numerous federal statutes that furnish a means to implementthe United States' treaty obligations, codify in domestic law the internationalsystem of tanker regulation, and confirm the United States' leadership indeveloping international rules for tanker safety. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No.1384, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 1, at 6-9 (1978).3 Many of the statutoryprovisions in turn direct the Secretary of Transportation (who has delegatedthat authority to the Coast Guard, 49 C.F.R. 1.46 (b) and (c)) to establishthe applicable standards.
Of particular relevance here, in a statutory provision drawn from TitleII of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA), Congress has broadlydirected the Secretary to "prescribe regulations for the design, construction,alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification,and manning" of tank vessels "that may be necessary for increasedprotection against hazards to life and property, for navigation and vesselsafety, and for enhanced protection of the marine environment." 46U.S.C. 3703(a). In developing those standards, the Secretary must consultwith and consider the views of interested federal agencies, "officialsof State and local governments," "representatives of port andharbor authorities and associations," "representatives of environmentalgroups," and "other interested parties knowledgeable or experiencedin dealing with problems involving vessel safety, port and waterways safety,and protection of the marine environment." 46 U.S.C. 3703(c). A tankvessel of the United States must have a certificate of inspection issuedby the Secretary endorsed to indicate that the vessel complies with federalregulations. 46 U.S.C. 3710(a). Consistent with the role those regulationsplay in implementing the international regime, however, Congress has providedthat with respect to foreign flag tank vessels, the Secretary may accepta certificate issued by the government of a foreign country under a treaty,convention, or other international agreement to which the United Statesis a party, as a basis for issuing a certificate of compliance with federalstandards. 46 U.S.C. 3711(a). See also 33 U.S.C. 1221-1236 (complementaryprovisions under Title I of the PWSA).4
Because the United States is both a "flag state" (meaning thatit is responsible for developing standards and regulations for ships flyingthe U.S. flag) and a "port state" (meaning that U.S. ports receivecargo, and oil in particular, arriving on foreign-flag vessels), the UnitedStates has a substantial interest in ensuring that all vessels that transitits waters, particularly foreign-flag vessels, comply with comprehensivesafety and environmental protection standards. The International Conventionfor the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention), Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T.47, establishes that every ship, when in a port of another signatory nation,is "subject to control by officers duly authorized by [the port nation]Government in so far as this control is directed towards verifying thatthe certificates issued under [the Convention] are valid." Annex, Ch.I, Pt. B, Reg. 19(a), Int'l Maritime Org., Doc. Sales No. IMO-110E (1997).But the SOLAS Convention, like other conventions at issue in this case,requires port nations to accept valid certificates (issued by the flag nationgovernment) unless there are clear grounds for believing that the conditionof the ship or its equipment does not correspond substantially with theconditions for which the certificate was issued. Id. at 19(b).5 If controlis exercised and a ship is unduly detained or delayed, the port nation governmentis responsible for compensation for any loss or damage suffered by the ship.Id. at 19(f). Chapter I of the SOLAS Convention provides that foreign shipsare subject to control only by officers duly authorized by the nationalgovernment that is the signatory to the Convention. Pursuant to ExecutiveOrder No. 12,234 (see 3 C.F.R. 277 (1981)), which implements the SOLAS Convention,and the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-324, §602, 110 Stat. 3927, Coast Guard employees are duly authorized officerswho may subject foreign vessels to control in U.S. ports under that Convention.Officials of Washington and other States are not.
b. In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978), this Court addressedwhether Washington State regulations applicable to tankers were preemptedby various provisions of federal law, specifically including regulationsissued under one of the Acts of Congress- the Ports and Waterways SafetyAct of 1972 (PWSA) -that is at issue in this case. In holding that the State'sattempts to regulate the design of oil tankers were preempted, the Courtconcluded that, in Title II of the PWSA, 46 U.S.C. 391a (Supp. V 1975) (nowcodified as amended at 46 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.), Congress "has entrustedto the Secretary [of Transportation] the duty of determining which oil tankersare sufficiently safe to be allowed to proceed in the navigable waters ofthe United States." 435 U.S. at 163. The Court noted that "Congressexpressed a preference for international action and expressly anticipatedthat foreign vessels would or could be considered sufficiently safe forcertification by the Secretary if they satisfied the requirements arrivedat by treaty or convention." Id. at 168. With respect to personnel,staffing, and operational requirements, the Court concluded that Washington'sregulations were not automatically preempted by Title I of the PWSA, 33U.S.C. 1221-1227 (Supp. V 1975) (now codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. 1221-1231),in the absence of federal regulations addressing the same subject matter.435 U.S. at 171. But the Court emphasized that if the Coast Guard adoptsregulatory requirements governing a particular subject (or concludes thatno such requirements should be adopted at all), a State's inconsistent rulesare ousted by operation of the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 171-172; see id.at 173-178 (invalidating Washington statute excluding from Puget Sound alltankers in excess of 125,000 deadweight tons because it differed from aCoast Guard rule).
c. After the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska in 1989, Congress enactedthe Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484.Title I of OPA sets federal standards for liability and damages for thedischarge of oil into navigable waters of the United States. 104 Stat. 486-506.Subtitle A of Title IV- which concerns oil-spill prevention-addresses certaindiscrete issues relating to tanker personnel qualifications, manning, operations,design, and construction, and it does so in part by strengthening (or directingthe exercise of) certain powers the Secretary already had under prior law.104 Stat. 509-523. In that Subtitle, Congress required a design and constructionstandard that differed from international ones in only one respect, by mandatingdouble hulls for certain types of tank vessels that operate in U.S. watersregardless of their flags (46 U.S.C. 3703a(a)), with an exception for vesselstransiting through the territorial waters of the United States in innocentpassage (46 U.S.C. 3702(e)). See OPA § 4115, 104 Stat. 517.6 In allother respects, Subtitle A is consistent with international standards. See,e.g., OPA § 4106(a) and (b), 104 Stat. 513-514 (directing the Secretaryto "evaluate the manning, training, qualification, and watchkeepingstandards of a foreign country that issues documents" for covered tankersto ensure that they "are at least equivalent to United States law orinternational standards accepted by the United States").
d. In 1994, Washington adopted new regulatory requirements, which it called"Best Available Protection" (BAP) Regulations. Those rules weredesigned to impose more stringent safety requirements on tankers, and therebyprevent oil spills. In pertinent part, those rules require installationof specified navigational and emergency towing equipment; impose reportingrequirements for certain vessel casualties regardless of whether they occurin Washington waters; mandate particular language-proficiency requirementsand personnel qualifications for vessel officers and crews; establish maximumcrew work hours; set drug-testing policies; and impose position-monitoringrequirements. See App. 57a-60a (describing the provisions). Washington'sregulations concerning personnel, management, and operation of vessels departfrom the federal and international regulatory regime in numerous ways. See,e.g., pages 17-20, infra.

2. The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko)brought this suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against Washingtonstate and local officials responsible for enforcing the BAP regulations.The district court granted Washington's motion for summary judgment anddenied Intertanko's motion. App. 55a-89a. The district court recognizedthat "[a]lthough protection of the marine environment has historicallybeen within the reach of the police powers of the state, shipping has traditionallybeen governed by federal law." App. 61a. The court also had "nodoubt that the areas addressed by the Washington oil spill prevention rules,which generally cover tanker operations, personnel, management, technology,and information reporting, are also comprehensively regulated by federalstatutes, regulations and treaty obligations." App. 69a. The courtnevertheless sustained all of the Washington regulations.
The court relied principally on Section 1018 of OPA, which provides that"[n]othing in this Act" shall affect or preempt the authorityof a State to impose "any additional liability or requirements withrespect to * * * the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within suchState," or "additional liability or additional requirements ** * relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, ofoil." 33 U.S.C. 2718(a) and (c). The court concluded that, since TitleIV of OPA contains some provisions addressing tanker operations, personnelmanagement, technology, and information reporting, the effect of Section1018 is that there is no preemption of state laws that are inconsistentwith the federal regulatory regime, even though that regime rests on Actsof Congress other than OPA. App. 69a. The court also found the inconsistencybetween the Washington rules and the international regime of maritime regulationimplemented by federal law to be immaterial, since Congress had departedfrom the international regime in OPA by mandating a requirement of a doublehull on oil tankers-a step that, the court opined, "demonstrates thatCongress was not overly concerned with maintaining uniformity with suchstandards." App. 66a.
The court also engaged in a separate "implied preemption" analysis,and determined that although Congress has occupied the field of regulatingoil tanker design and construction, it has not done so in other areas inwhich a State might exercise its police powers to protect the environment.App. 69a-76a. Although the district court recognized that in Ray this Courthad held that Coast Guard regulations issued under the PWSA preempt statelaws in those other areas of tanker regulation as well, App. 70a-72a, thecourt concluded that Section 1018 of OPA required a different result here,notwithstanding the Coast Guard's expression of intent to preempt statelaws, App. 76a-77a.7

3. The United States intervened after Intertanko appealed the district court'sdecision to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversedin part. App. 1a-35a. The court held that several Washington regulationsrequiring tank vessels to have certain navigation and towing equipment arepreempted, App. 26a-29a, and that state regulations imposing requirementswith respect to staffing, personnel training, qualifications, and operationof tank vessels are not preempted, even where they depart from standardsset in international agreements and Coast Guard regulations, App. 7a- 25a.
Like the district court, the court of appeals relied primarily on Section1018 of OPA. The court of appeals recognized that OPA is not the only federalstatute that regulates tanker vessels, noting that the PWSA, the Port andTanker Safety Act of 1978, and the Tank Vessel Act of 1936 do so as well.App. 11a. The court of appeals rejected Washington's contention that Section1018 of OPA, which provides that "this Act" shall not have preemptiveeffect, also applies to those other federal statutes. The court found thatinterpretation inconsistent with the "plain meaning" of Section1018. Ibid. The court nevertheless held that the Washington regulationsgoverning staffing, personnel training and qualifications, and operationof tank vessels are not preempted by Coast Guard regulations issued underthose other federal statutes. App. 13a-19a. The court reasoned that OPA,"[a]s the most recent federal statute in the field, * * * reflectsthe full purposes and objectives of Congress, better than [the other statutesgoverning tankers], all of which [OPA] was designed to complement."App. 16a (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted). Inthe court's view, Section 1018 of OPA "demonstrates Congress's willingnessto permit state efforts in the areas of oil-spill prevention, removal, liability,and compensation." Ibid.
Next, the court of appeals rejected the contention that the challenged staterules are invalid because they conflict with various international agreementsgoverning tankers. The court found that Congress had not embraced strictinternational uniformity because the relevant treaties set only minimumstandards, and each signatory nation can impose higher standards. App. 17a-18a.The court similarly did not find the federal regulation of tankers to beso comprehensive as to preempt the field of tanker regulation. Rather, itread this Court's decision in Ray to require field preemption only of staterules governing tanker design, construction, and equipment, but not of rulespertaining to tanker operations, personnel policies, and other staffingrequirements. App. 21a-25a.
Finally, the court of appeals concluded that Coast Guard tanker regulationsdo not preempt Washington's BAP rules even where the Coast Guard has expressedan intent to preempt such rules. App. 29a-32a. The court recited the Court'sconclusion in Ray that the relevant inquiry under the federal statutes providingfor regulation of oil tankers is whether the Secretary has either promulgatedhis own regulations on the particular subject or decided that no such requirementshould be imposed at all. App. 29a. But the court then proceeded to holdthat, under those same statutes, "Congress did not explicitly or impliedlydelegate to the Coast Guard the authority to preempt state law." App.31a. The court again relied on Section 1018 of OPA, reasoning that in viewof Congress's unwillingness to preempt state oil-spill prevention effortson its own, it was "implausible" to conclude that Congress intendedto delegate power to the Coast Guard to do so.8

4. The court denied petitions for rehearing filed by the United States andby Intertanko. App. 36a. Judge Graber dissented. App. 36a-54a. In her view,the court's reliance on Section 1018 of OPA was misplaced, because thatsection is limited to liability and compensation for oil spills, and doesnot apply to preventive measures. App. 51a. Judge Graber also concludedthat the court had erred in holding that Congress must specifically haveintended to give the Coast Guard power to preempt state regulatory schemes.App. 52a-54a.

The Ninth Circuit's decision in this case conflicts with a holding of thisCourt in an area of international commerce critical to the Nation's economy.As this Court made clear in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151(1978), the Supremacy Clause requires a finding of preemption when a staterule diverges from or federal standards regarding the design, equipping,staffing, operation, or construction of tank vessels. The court below thereforeerred in holding categorically that Washington's rules governing staffingand operation of tank vessels are not preempted, rather than engaging inthe type of provision-by-provision analysis mandated by Ray. The resultof the Ninth Circuit's decision is to leave in place a set of state rulesthat differ in numerous ways from international standards and Coast Guardregulations governing the same subject matter.
The Ninth Circuit's decision gravely impairs the Coast Guard's longstandingauthority to establish uniform national rules for vessels in interstateand foreign commerce and the United States' ability to conform to the internationalvessel-management regime. That regime rests on the principle of reciprocity,under which the flag nation certifies the compliance of its vessels withinternational rules, and that certification is then accepted by other participatingnations. The Ninth Circuit's decision also substantially undermines theability of the United States to speak with one voice in international negotiationsto promote tanker safety and environmental protection. Review by this Courttherefore is warranted.
1. The Ninth Circuit's decision squarely conflicts with this Court's decisionin Ray and incorrectly applies the principles of federal preemption to theWashington State regulations governing oil tankers in foreign trade.
a. More than 20 years ago, this Court held in Ray that the Supremacy Clauseof the Constitution barred the State of Washington from imposing certainregulatory requirements and restrictions on oil tankers in Puget Sound thatdiffered from standards imposed by federal law. Ray construed Titles I andII of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA) to establish a setof principles for federal preemption of state rules with respect to a rangeof international vessel-management requirements. Although the Court in Rayrecognized the legitimate police powers of States to issue certain rulesto protect coastlines from oil spills, the Court emphasized that such rulesmust give way when a federal or international vessel requirement has beenestablished. 435 U.S. at 172. The Court explained that Congress acted to"make it absolutely clear that the Coast Guard regulation of vesselspreempts state action in this field," id. at 174 (quoting H.R. Rep.No. 563, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1971)), and vested authority in the CoastGuard to ensure "consistency of regulation and thoroughness of consideration"of the wide variety of interests to be affected, id. at 176. "[I]twas anticipated that there would be a single decisionmaker, rather thana different one in each State." Id. at 177.
Applying that analytical framework, the Court in Ray undertook a detailed,section-by-section analysis of each state provision at issue to determinewhether a national standard existed in a federal statute or regulation addressingthe same subject matter. In doing so, the Court held that federal law preemptedstate vessel regulations that required a tanker enrolled strictly in coastaltrade to have a local pilot aboard, 435 U.S. at 158; imposed requirementson the design and construction of tankers in addition to the minimum federalstandards required to obtain certificates of compliance issued by the Secretaryof Transportation, id. at 160-163; and imposed operating rules that differedfrom rules adopted by the Secretary concerning the passage of ships in excessof a particular tonnage, id. at 173-178. The Court did uphold a Washingtonstate rule requiring a tug escort for certain tankers, but it did so onlybecause the issue of tug escorts had not been addressed by federal regulations.The Court specifically noted that "[i]t may be that rules will be forthcomingthat will pre-empt the State's present tug-escort rule, but until that occurs,the State's requirement need not give way under the Supremacy Clause."Id. at 172.
b. As with the state regulations found to be preempted in Ray, the Stateof Washington has once again sought to impose rules that differ in substantialrespects from federal standards promulgated pursuant to federal statutesand international treaties.9 Rather than engage in the type of provision-by-provisionanalysis required by Ray, however, the court of appeals held categoricallythat state rules pertaining to the staffing and operation of tankers arenot preempted by Coast Guard regulations, without regard to whether thestate rules conflict with the federal regulations.10 App. 16a, 25a. Thatholding is flatly inconsistent with Ray. There the Court held that "[t]herelevant inquiry under Title I [of the PWSA] with respect to the State'spower to impose [operating rules] is * * * whether the Secretary has eitherpromulgated his own * * * requirement for Puget Sound tanker navigationor has decided that no such requirement should be imposed at all."435 U.S. at 171-172.
The result of the Ninth Circuit's decision is to leave in place a numberof Washington regulations that are inconsistent with federal law and specificinternational standards. The following examples are drawn for illustrativepurposes, and are not intended to compose an exhaustive list of the Washingtonregulations that create such conflicts:
- Operating Procedures; Restricted Visibility: The Washington BAP rulesrequire three licensed deck officers on watch during times of restrictedvisibility, one of whom may be a state-licensed pilot when the vessel isin pilotage waters. Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(1)(a) (1998). Thatrequirement diverges from the Coast Guard requirement of two licensed deckofficers. See 33 C.F.R. 164.13(c) (regulation implementing the STCW Convention).Because crews are staffed to meet international standards, the Washingtonrules also necessarily interfere with the accomplishment of another internationalstandard: ensuring that watch officers obtain at least ten hours of restin any 24-hour period, which must be provided in "no more than twoperiods, one of which shall be at least 6 hours in length." STCW Code,§ A-VIII/1. To comply with both the state personnel watch requirementsand the international crew-rest standards, therefore, any vessel destinedfor Washington waters (or in transit through those waters) must increaseits crew complement or fly additional personnel to the vessel prior to enteringWashington waters.
- Drug and Alcohol Testing and Reporting: The Washington regulations requireextensive drug and alcohol testing of all crew members on tankers, includingforeign flag vessels. Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-235 (1998). Thoseregulations further require that the results of a positive drug test bereported to Washington within 72 hours of the confirmed test result. Thosestate requirements appear to apply to a drug test conducted anywhere inthe world for a vessel that might arrive in Washington waters weeks or monthslater. Washington's requirement of random testing of all crew members onall of the vessels operated by a carrier throughout the world creates arule different from the Coast Guard's standards, which establish post-accidentand reasonable-cause testing rules for foreign flag vessels. See 46 C.F.R.4.05-12; 46 C.F.R. Subpt. 4.06; 46 C.F.R. 16.240; 33 C.F.R. 95.035.11 Moreover,numerous foreign governments, including the Government of Canada, have informedthe Coast Guard that their laws might not allow the testing of individualsin accordance with the Washington requirements. See 59 Fed. Reg. 65,500-65,501(1994); 57 Fed. Reg. 31,274 (1992); 56 Fed. Reg. 18,982 (1991); 53 Fed.Reg. 47,070-47,071 (1988). Indeed, even under United States law, the randomtesting of individuals is limited to those individuals aboard vessels whooccupy positions of safety that are specifically identified in the regulations.46 C.F.R. 16.230; see also 56 Fed. Reg. 31,030 (1991) (noting concerns basedon Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures).
- Crew Training Policies: The Washington regulations require "trainingbeyond the training necessary to obtain a license or merchant marine document."Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-230 (1998). That provision exceeds the requirementsof the STCW Convention, pursuant to which a certificate by a flag statewill be afforded respect through reciprocity in the United States. See STCWConvention, Arts. VI, X; 46 C.F.R. Pt. 12. To meet the State's requirements,a crew would have to be flown in advance to Washington for training beforeserving on a voyage to Washington waters, a requirement that would oftenbe impractical given the commercial realities of international shipping,in which vessels are frequently re-routed in mid-voyage to new destinationsfor the pickup or delivery of cargo. The practical effect of the Washingtonintrusion into international training requirements is that unless the additionalstate training requirements have been met, foreign and U.S. flag vesselsalike may not enter Washington waters.
- Language Proficiency Requirements: The Washington BAP rules require that"[a]ll licensed deck officers and the vessel's designated person incharge under 33 CFR sec. 155.700 are proficient in English and speak a languageunderstood and spoken by subordinate officers and unlicensed crew."Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-250(1) (1998). The international requirementsthat the United States has agreed to observe, by contrast, require an officerin charge of the navigation watch to be able to "perform the officer'sduties * * * with a multilingual crew." See STCW Code, Tab. A-II/1,Col. 2, English language. The STCW standard requires licensed deck officersto be able to communicate with those who are part of the navigation watch,and only on those matters relevant to watch-keeping duties. The Washingtonregulations, on the other hand, require all licensed deck officers to speakthe languages of the entire unlicensed crew, a requirement that imposessubstantial additional costs and burdens on ship owners and operators.
c. There can be no doubt that the Washington regulations just discussedare preempted under the analysis mandated by this Court's decision in Ray.The court of appeals believed, however, that, since the enactment of OPAin 1990, the Coast Guard no longer has the authority to issue regulationsthat preempt state rules addressing the same subject matter. That conclusionis deeply flawed.
Contrary to the court of appeals' view, nothing in OPA affects Ray's holdingthat the Coast Guard has authority to issue regulations that preempt staterules on the same subject. It would be surprising indeed for Congress tohave deprived the Coast Guard of that power to adopt uniform national standards,since, as the district court acknowledged, "shipping has traditionallybeen governed by federal law." App. 61a. And, in fact, the ConferenceReport on OPA expressly states that OPA "does not disturb the SupremeCourt's decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 435 U.S. 151 (1978)."H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1990) (emphasis added).
Significantly, moreover, OPA did not amend the provisions of the PWSA-whichwere relied upon by the Court in Ray, 435 U.S. at 161, 170, and are nowcodified at 33 U.S.C. 1231 and 46 U.S.C. 3703-that authorize and directthe Secretary to issue regulations governing the design, construction, alteration,repair, maintenance, operation, equipment, personnel qualification, andstaffing of tanker vessels. Those statutory provisions identify a role forthe States in the process of developing such standards: they require theSecretary to consult with and "consider[] the views" of "officialsof State and local governments." 33 U.S.C. 1231(b)(2); 46 U.S.C. 3703(c)(2).Those provisions plainly do not contemplate that-after the Secretary hasconsulted with the States, considered their views, taken international standardsinto account, struck a balance among competing considerations, and adopteduniform federal standards-the States are then free to adopt divergent lawson the very same subjects.
In addition, Title IV of OPA makes plain that Congress intended to reinforce,not undermine, the established regime of international uniformity and reciprocityon such issues as staffing, training, and operation. Thus, Congress specificallydirected the Secretary of Transportation to evaluate the "manning,training, qualification, and watchkeeping standards of a foreign countrythat issues documentation" to tankers, in order to determine whetherthey are "at least equivalent to United States law or internationalstandards accepted by the United States"; and Congress provided thatthe Secretary may prohibit entry into the United States of vessels withdocumentation issued by countries that do not maintain and enforce suchstandards. OPA § 4106(a), 104 Stat. 513 (codified at 46 U.S.C. 9101(a)).That directive to the Secretary of Transportation refutes the Ninth Circuit'sconclusion that Congress, in enacting OPA, subordinated the need for internationaluniformity and reciprocity to the divergent policy preferences of the States.Cf. App. 16a.
In holding that the Coast Guard no longer has the power recognized in Rayto issue regulations having preemptive effect, the court of appeals reliedalmost exclusively on Section 1018 of OPA. See App. 16a. But as the courtrecognized elsewhere in its opinion, see App. 12a, Section 1018 addressesonly the preemptive effect of "this Act"-i.e., of OPA itself-notthe preemptive effect of other federal statutes, such as the PWSA, at issuein Ray. The court of appeals' holding thus boils down to the notion thateven though Section 1018 of OPA neither applies to other federal statutessuch as the PWSA nor alters the Secretary's rulemaking authority under them,it nevertheless has a sort of penumbral effect that divests the Coast Guardof the power it previously had to issue preempting regulations under thoseother federal statutes. Simply to state that proposition is to refute it.Under the Constitution, Congress could divest the Coast Guard of that powerunder prior law only by enacting a new law that repealed that prior authority.See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 (1983). Congress did not do that inOPA.
Properly understood, then, Section 1018 expresses an intent for OPA notto displace whatever police powers States otherwise might have had priorto OPA. Thus, whether state tanker laws are preempted turns on the vastbody of federal treaty, statutory, and regulatory provisions governing tankeroperations, as well as the international regime on which those provisionsof United States law are based.
d. The court of appeals' erroneous reliance on Section 1018 of OPA alsounderlies its further (and equally erroneous) holding that Coast Guard regulationsthat are otherwise valid require additional legislative authority to havepreemptive effect. See App. 29a-31a. That decision is erroneous in at leasttwo important respects. First, 33 U.S.C. 1231 and 46 U.S.C. 3703 conferbroad authority on the Coast Guard, after "considering the views"of the State and balancing competing considerations, to prescribe regulationsfor the design, construction, operation, equipping, personnel qualification,and staffing of tank vessels. Those provisions, which are unaffected byOPA, furnish ample authority for Coast Guard regulations that preempt conflictingstate rules. Moreover, as this Court held in Ray, the Secretary alreadyhad authority under those provisions of the PWSA to issue regulations thatpreempt state regulatory efforts. Congress was not required to confer thatauthority all over again in OPA.
Second, and more fundamentally, Congress need not specifically confer preemptiveauthority on a federal agency for that agency's rules to have preemptiveeffect. In City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1988), for example, thisCourt explained that "a narrow focus on Congress' intent to supersedestate law is misdirected, for a pre-emptive regulation's force does notdepend on express congressional authorization to displace state law."Id. at 64 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). In identifying"the correct focus" of a regulatory preemption inquiry, the Courtleft no doubt that "statutorily authorized regulations of an agencywill pre-empt any state or local law that conflicts with such regulationsor frustrates the purposes thereof." Ibid.; accord Fidelity Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982) ("A pre-emptiveregulation's force does not depend on express congressional authorizationto displace state law.").12
e. Had the court of appeals conducted the proper preemption inquiry, itwould have analyzed (or remanded to the district court to analyze) whethereach of the state rules at issue conflicts with federal regulations or internationaltreaty obligations, or otherwise hinders the effectuation of federal objectivesin establishing uniform rules for tankers engaged in coastal and internationaltrade. If factual questions arose about whether the state rules are inconsistentwith federally-imposed standards or otherwise interfere with the federalgoal of international reciprocity, the proper course would have been todevelop a record on those issues.

2. Review is warranted in this case because the Ninth Circuit's decisiongravely impairs the Coast Guard's longstanding authority to adopt uniformnational rules affecting interstate and foreign shipping and the UnitedStates' ability to comply with its international obligations.
a. The United States has long had a strong interest in developing a uniformsystem of international obligations to regulate tankers. Those obligations,which are negotiated by various federal agencies and implemented throughinternational commitments and regulations promulgated by the Coast Guard,seek to establish safety standards in such areas as tanker design, construction,equipment, staffing, and operations. The concept of reciprocity is criticalto maintaining enforcement of uniform international standards. Through recognitionand enforcement of standards mutually agreed-upon in the international community,Congress and the Coast Guard have specifically provided that the UnitedStates will accept flag-state certification of compliance with requirementsconcerning such matters as seafarer qualifications and training, in exchangefor the recognition of certification by the United States that a vesselcomplies with those international standards. See page 3 and note 2, supra.Compare Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 323-324 (1988) (discussing the importanceof reciprocity in international relations).13 This Court in Ray upheld thepreemptive effect of that regime on inconsistent state rules. As the Courtemphasized, Congress did not intend to permit a situation in which "avessel * * * holding a Secretary's permit, or its equivalent, [a permitfrom its flag nation,] to carry the relevant cargo would nevertheless bebarred by state law from operating in the navigable waters of the UnitedStates." 435 U.S. at 164. "The Supremacy Clause dictates thatthe federal judgment that a vessel is safe to navigate United States watersprevail over the contrary state judgment." Id. at 165. Congress nomore intended to permit States to frustrate that federal purpose here, wherethe relevant certifications concern training and staffing policies, thanit did in Ray.
b. The competing legal regime erected by Washington poses substantial andimmediate diplomatic concerns for the United States in several criticalrespects. First, the existence of state regulations that conflict with internationalstandards raises the distinct possibility that other nations that are signatoriesto international conventions and agreements will regard the United Statesas in violation of its obligations and commitments and thus take actionsin response that will further undermine international uniformity. In thatregard, the Department of State received a diplomatic note specificallyaddressing the Washington State BAP regulations from 13 nations (Belgium,Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden) and the Commission of the European Communityexpressing concerns that "[d]iffering regimes in different parts ofthe US would create uncertainty and confusion. * * * The Governments thereforeurge the US to pursue a regulatory regime, on a national basis, which isconsistent with agreed international standards." Note Verbale fromthe Royal Danish Embassy to the U.S. Department of State 1 (June 14, 1996)(File No. 60 USA.1/4). On May 7, 1997, the Government of Canada submitteda similar diplomatic protest. Letter from the Embassy of Canada to the U.S.Department of State 1 (Note No. 0389).
Since those countries represent major maritime trading nations, significantallies of the United States, and leaders in establishing international vesselstandards, their diplomatic protest is entitled to significant respect bythis Court in considering this petition for a writ of certiorari. Indeed,a decision by other nations that the United States is in noncompliance withan international treaty obligation could lead to the abrogation of the agreement,a decision not to afford reciprocity to United States vessels in foreignports, and considerable uncertainty in the legal regime governing internationalvessel management.14
Moreover, the conflicting Washington regulations undermine the credibilityof the United States in negotiating international agreements that promotesafe use of tankers around the world. The culmination of such negotiationshas had, and will continue to have, significant desirable consequences forshipping and environmental protection in the coastal waters of the UnitedStates and its trading partners. For that kind of diplomatic bargainingto result in agreements that other nations will enforce, however, the UnitedStates negotiators must be assured that they can represent the entire UnitedStates, and not be undermined by the actions of individual States that departfrom the international regime and the United States' implementation of it.Because of the international nature of the shipping industry, the establishmentof vessel standards for safety and environmental protection is generallymost effective when carried out on an internationally cooperative levelrather than by individual nations or political subdivisions of those nationsacting on their own. See, e.g., S. Treaty Doc. No. 39, supra, at III.15
c. In view of the immediate consequences caused by the Ninth Circuit's decisionsustaining rules adopted by Washington that conflict with internationaland federal rules-and the Ninth Circuit's clear error under Ray in doingso-the Court should grant review now, rather than waiting for decisionsof other States or courts to create further disuniformity in the internationalvessel-management system. Indeed, in past cases this Court has recognizedthe appropriateness of exercising its certiorari jurisdiction to resolveimportant questions affecting foreign relations before conflicting decisionsin the courts of appeals have emerged. For example, the Court has grantedcertiorari to consider "[i]mportant questions concerning the effectof treaty and statute upon the privilege of aliens to acquire citizenship."Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 42 (1951). Similarly, certiorari wasappropriate where a case "involve[d] important rights asserted in relianceupon federal treaty obligations." Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187,191 (1961). See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,407 (1964) ("We granted certiorari because the issues involved bearimportantly on the conduct of the country's foreign relations and more particularlyon the proper role of the Judicial Branch in this sensitive area.");International Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S.195, 196 (1970) (certiorari granted to consider whether a federal statutepreempted state law governing picketing against foreign-flag vessels inU.S. ports); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.428 (1989) (certiorari granted to review whether the Foreign Sovereign ImmunitiesAct provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign statein the United States).
If the Ninth Circuit decision is permitted to stand, every coastal Statewithin the United States could feel empowered to adopt and enforce its ownrequirements, notwithstanding their inconsistency with the regulations ofother States, the United States, and international treaties. Just in theNinth Circuit alone, the consequences of state-by-state variations in tankerregulations could be highly problematic. The multiplicity of overlappingregulatory requirements within the United States would further frustratethe substantial national and international interests in uniform standards.The Court therefore should grant review to halt the unraveling of thoseuniform standards that has been sanctioned by the Ninth Circuit in thiscase.