The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on March 5, 1999. On May25, 1999, the Chief Justice extended the time within which to file a petitionfor a writ of certiorari to and including June 30, 1999. The jurisdictionof this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
1. The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section8, Clause 3, provides: "The Congress shall have Power * * * To regulateCommerce * * * among the several States."

2. The Equal Protection Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendmentprovides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdictionthe equal protection of the laws." Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendmentprovides that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriatelegislation, the provisions of this article."

3. The civil rights provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,42 U.S.C. 13981, is reprinted in an appendix to this petition (App. 404a-406a).

This case presents a constitutional challenge to 42 U.S.C. 13981, the provisionof the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA) that gives victims of gender-motivatedviolence a private right of action against its perpetrators. Congress, afterextensive hearings, expressly found that gender-motivated violence substantiallyaffects interstate commerce, such as by impeding the employment, travel,and other economic activity of the victims and potential victims of suchviolence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however,interpreted this Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549(1995), to compel a holding that the commerce power extends to the regulationof only those intrastate activities that are themselves economic in nature,and not to other activities that substantially affect interstate commerce,such as gender-motivated violence. Congress also expressly found that theStates had failed, as a result of pervasive bias in their civil and criminaljustice systems, to guarantee the equal protection of the laws to victimsof gender-motivated violence. The Fourth Circuit, however, construed thisCourt's decisions in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), and theCivil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), to compel a holding that, becausethe Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment itself regulatesonly state action, Congress cannot regulate private conduct as a means ofremedying violations of the Equal Protection Clause by the States and bystate actors.
1. Congress enacted VAWA in 1994 to address "the escalating problemof violence against women." S. Rep. No. 138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.37 (1993) (1993 S. Rep.). Congress chose to address that problem through"several different complementary strategies," S. Rep. No. 197,102d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1991) (1991 S. Rep.), including new federal crimes,a new federal civil remedy, and new federal grant programs. The crimes createdby VAWA punish certain types of interstate domestic violence. See 18 U.S.C.2261, 2262 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).1 The grant programs authorized $1.6billion in federal spending over six years to support state, local, andtribal efforts to reduce violence against women, including rape preventionand education programs, law-enforcement efforts, victim services programs,battered women's shelters, and improved security in public transit. See42 U.S.C. 300w-10, 3796gg, 10409(a), 13931.
Congress considered one of VAWA's "[m]ost important[]" componentsto be its civil rights provision, Section 13981, which gives victims ofgender-motivated violence a federal cause of action against its perpetrators.1993 S. Rep. 38. Congress described Section 13981 as "mak[ing] a nationalcommitment to condemn crimes motivated by gender in just the same way thatwe have made a national commitment to condemn crimes motivated by race orreligion." S. Rep. No. 545, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1990) (1990 S.Rep.).
Section 13981(b) declares that "[a]ll persons within the United Statesshall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender."Section 13981(c), in turn, provides:
A person * * * who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thusdeprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) of this section[to be free from gender-motivated violence] shall be liable to the partyinjured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages,injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court maydeem appropriate.
Section 13981(d) then defines a "crime of violence motivated by gender"that could give rise to such a cause of action. A "crime of violence"is defined as "an act or series of acts that would constitute a felonyagainst the person" (or a felony against property if the conduct poses"a serious risk of physical injury" to a person) and would satisfythe definition of a "crime of violence" in 18 U.S.C. 16, "whetheror not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution,or conviction." 42 U.S.C. 13981(d)(2).2 Such a crime is "motivatedby gender" if it was committed "due, at least in part, to an animusbased on the victim's gender." 42 U.S.C. 13981(d)(1).
Section 13981(a) identifies two sources of Congress's constitutional authorityto create a federal cause of action for victims of gender-motivated violence:the Commerce Clause, which is found in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution,and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2. In the Conference Report adopted in connection with VAWA, Congress explainedwhy its commerce power extends to the regulation of gender-motivated violence:
[C]rimes of violence motivated by gender have a subtantial adverse effecton interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate,from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transactingwith business, and in places involved, in interstate commerce; crimes ofviolence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstatecommerce by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and othercosts, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 711, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 385 (1994) (Conf. Rep.); seealso 1993 S. Rep. 54 ("Gender-based crimes and the fear of gender-basedcrimes restrict[] movement, reduce[] employment opportunities, increase[]health expenditures, and reduce[] consumer spending, all of which affectinterstate commerce and the national economy.").
Congress reached that conclusion after four years of extensive investigationand consideration of the problem of gender-motivated violence. At a seriesof committee hearings conducted between 1990 and 1993, Congress heard testimonyfrom a variety of experts: state attorneys general, federal and state law-enforcementofficials, physicians, mental health professionals, legal scholars, representativesof women's organizations, and victims of gender-motivated violence. Thevoluminous evidence amassed during those hearings demonstrated to Congressthat gender-motivated violence is pervasive, has a substantial effect oninterstate commerce, and often goes unremedied due to widespread bias instate justice systems.3
a. Congress's extensive fact-finding revealed that violence against womenis a problem of the first magnitude and of national scope. For example,the evidence showed:
( "Violent attacks by men now top[] the list of dangers to an Americanwoman's health. Every 15 seconds, a woman is battered and, every 6 minutes,a woman is raped in the United States." 1991 S. Rep. 36.
( "Every week, during 1991, more than 2,000 women were raped and morethan 90 women were murdered-9 out of 10 by men." 1993 S. Rep. 38.
( "An estimated 4 million American women are battered each year bytheir husbands or partners. Approximately 95% of all domestic violence victimsare women." H.R. Rep. No. 395, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1993) (1993House Rep.).
( "Three out of four American women will be victims of violent crimessometime during their life." Id. at 25.
The evidence before Congress further demonstrates that violence againstwomen has a substantial impact on interstate commerce. As the 1993 SenateReport explained, "[g]ender-based violence bars its most likely targets-women-from full [participation] in the national economy," because violenceand the fear of violence prevent women from obtaining and retaining employment,traveling, and engaging in other economic activity. 1993 S. Rep. 54.
Of those women who are victims of rape, for example, "almost 50 percent* * * lose their jobs or are forced to quit in the aftermath of the crime."1993 S. Rep. 54. Even those women who remain employed after a rape or othercrime of violence may experience a prolonged period of decreased productivity.1990 S. Rep. 33. And "as many as 50 percent of homeless women and childrenare fleeing domestic violence." Id. at 37. It has thus been estimatedthat "violent crime against women costs this country at least 3 billion* * * dollars a year." Id. at 33; see also 1993 S. Rep. 41 (notingestimates that costs of domestic violence alone, including costs of victims'medical treatment, may amount to $5 billion to $10 billion a year).
Moreover, Congress found that "[e]ven the fear of gender-based violenceaffects the economy because it deters women from taking jobs in certainareas or at certain hours that pose a significant risk of such violence."1993 S. Rep. 54. For example, Congress found that "women often refusehigher-paying night jobs in the service/retail industries because of thefear of attack." Id. at 54 n.70.4 Unfortunately, as Congress recognized,"[t]hose fears are justified." Ibid. (citing statistics indicatingthat homicide is the leading cause of death of women on the job). In addition,Congress found that many women are reluctant, for similar reasons, to usepublic transportation, particularly after dark. 1991 S. Rep. 38.5
b. Congress found that the problem of gender-motivated violence was exacerbatedby pervasive bias in the state justice systems, including bias among policeofficers, prosecutors, judges, juries, and court employees. The ConferenceReport concluded that "bias and discrimination in the [state] criminaljustice system often deprive[] victims of crimes of violence motivated bygender of equal protection of the laws and the redress to which they areentitled." Conf. Rep. 385.
In reaching that conclusion, Congress relied, in part, on the reports compiledby numerous state task forces on gender bias. Congress found that "[s]tudyafter study commissioned by the highest courts of the States-from Floridato New York, California to New Jersey, Nevada to Minnesota-has concludedthat crimes disproportionately affecting women are often treated less seriouslythan comparable crimes against men." 1991 S. Rep. 43; see also id.at 43 n.40 and 1993 S. Rep. 45 n.29, 49 n.52 (citing 20 such studies conductedbetween 1984 and 1991). Congress noted that "[c]ollectively these reportsprovide overwhelming evidence that gender bias permeates the court systemand that women are most often its victims." 1991 S. Rep. 43-44 (quotingLynn H. Shafran, Overwhelming Evidence: Reports on Gender Bias In the Courts,Trial, Feb. 1990, at 28).
For example, the Illinois task force found that there was "a continuingsuspicion of the credibility of sexual assault victims on the part of police,prosecutors, judges, and juries." Illinois Task Force on Gender Biasin the Courts, Gender Bias in the Courts 16 (1990). Accordingly, "[a]lthoughrape is rarely committed before eyewitnesses and is often not reported immediately,prosecutors and investigators seek corroboration, including evidence ofa 'prompt complaint.'" Ibid. (noting that sexual assault victims, unlikevictims of other crimes, had been required by police and prosecutors totake polygraph tests). The Texas task force similarly found that "[w]omensexual-assault victims are accorded less credibility by the judicial systemthan victims of other types of assaults." Texas Gender Bias Task Force,Final Report 5 (1994). Women frequently confront the assumption that theyinvited or precipitated a sexual assault. See, e.g., 1991 S. Rep. 34 (describinghow a Vermont probation officer questioned whether a 9-year-old girl wasa "true victim" of sexual assault, since he had heard that shewas a "tramp") (quoting Vermont Supreme Court & Vermont BarAss'n, Report of the Vermont Task Force on Gender Bias in the Legal System140 (1991)). Such assumptions are particularly prevalent in cases of acquaintancerape, which prosecutors regularly refuse to prosecute. Id. at 47-48.
As a result of the task force reports on the treatment of sexual assault,together with testimony presented at congressional hearings, Congress found:
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing,crimes against women are often treated differently and less seriously thanother crimes. Police may refuse to take reports; prosecutors may encouragedefendants to plead to minor offenses; judges may rule against victims onevidentiary matters; and juries too often focus on the behavior of the survivors-layingblame on the victims instead of on the attackers.
1993 S. Rep. 42. As a result, "a rape survivor may have as little asa 5-percent chance of having her rapist convicted." 1991 S. Rep. 44;see also Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm.on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,103d Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1993) (1993 House Judiciary Hearings) (statementof Rep. Schroeder that "[l]ess than 40 percent of reported rapes resultin arrest * * * [and] [t]he conviction rate for rape is only 3 percent").
The state task force reports also demonstrated to Congress that "[g]enderbias contributes to the judicial system's failure to afford the protectionof the law to victims of domestic violence." 1993 S. Rep. 46. In California,the state task force found that "police officers, district and cityattorneys, court personnel, mediators, and judges-the justice system-treatedthe victims of domestic violence as though their complaints were trivial,exaggerated or somehow their own fault." Ibid. (quoting AdministrativeOffice of Judicial Council of California Courts, Achieving Equal Justicefor Women and Men in the Courts 5 (1993)); see also 1991 S. Rep. 34 (quotinga California judge as stating that a domestic violence victim in his court"probably should have been hit"). In Georgia, a state judge wasreported to have "mocked," "humiliated," and "ridiculed"a domestic violence victim who, in fact, was later killed by her estrangedhusband. 1991 S. Rep. 34 (quoting Supreme Court of Georgia, Report on Genderand Justice in the Judicial System 235 (1991)). And, in Maryland, a statejudge refused to believe a woman's complaint that her husband had threatenedto kill her with his gun "because I don't believe that anything likethis could happen to me." Ibid. (quoting Maryland Special Joint Committee,Gender Bias in the Courts 2-3 (1989)). Congress found that such attitudescause police, prosecutors, and judges to treat domestic violence more lenientlythan other sorts of violence. See 1993 S. Rep. 41 ("In cases wherea comparable assault by a stranger on the street would lead to a lengthyjail [term], a similar assault by a spouse will result neither in arrestnor in prosecution.").
Congress also found that state civil remedies for victims of sexual assaultand domestic violence are often significantly flawed. Congress noted, forexample, that "in many States rape survivors * * * may be forced toexpose their private lives and intimate conduct to win a damage award; and* * * in some cases, they may be barred from suit altogether by tort immunitydoctrines or marital exemptions." 1993 S. Rep. 55. Accordingly, whilesexual assault victims may, "[i]n theory," have certain civilremedies at their disposal, "[i]n practice, few are able to use thoseremedies." 1991 S. Rep. 44. Indeed, Congress noted that "[l]essthan 1 percent of all victims have collected damages" against theirassailants-a statistic that Congress believed "belie[s] claims thatState laws provide 'adequate' remedies for the victims of these crimes."Ibid.
Congress therefore concluded, based on its evaluation of the massive legislativerecord, that gender-motivated violence poses a national problem demandinga national response. The state attorneys general concurred: "Our experienceas Attorneys General strengthens our belief that the problem of violenceagainst women is a national one, requiring federal attention, federal leadership,and federal funds." 1993 House Judiciary Hearings 34-36 (letter from38 state attorneys general).
Congress viewed the private right of action provided by Section 13981, togetherwith the other provisions of VAWA, as an appropriate response to that nationalproblem. Congress explained that Section 13981's declaration that "[a]llpersons within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimesof violence motivated by gender" would make clear to all Americans-includingparticipants in the justice system-that "attacks motivated by gender[bias] [are] to be considered as serious as crimes motivated by religious,racial, or political bias." 1993 S. Rep. 38. Congress further explainedthat the private right of action in Section 13981 was particularly importantbecause it would "allow survivors an opportunity for legal vindicationthat the survivor, not the State, controls." 1990 S. Rep. 42.

3. In September 1994, at the time of the events at issue in this case, plaintiffChristy Brzonkala was an incoming freshman at Virginia Polytechnic Institute(Virginia Tech). Defendants Antonio Morrison and James Crawford were studentsat Virginia Tech and members of its football team. App. 8a.
Brzonkala alleges that 30 minutes after she met Morrison and Crawford, theypinned her down on a bed in her dormitory and took turns forcibly rapingher. Afterwards, Morrison allegedly told Brzonkala, "You better nothave any f***ing diseases." Subsequently, Morrison allegedly announcedpublicly in the dormitory's dining hall that "I like to get girls drunkand f*** the s*** out of them." App. 8a, 212a.
According to Brzonkala, she became depressed and withdrawn after the assault.She ceased attending classes, attempted suicide, and required psychiatrictreatment. She ultimately withdrew from school. App. 212a-213a.

4. In December 1995, Brzonkala brought this action against Morrison andCrawford, invoking Section 13981, VAWA's civil rights provision. Morrisonand Crawford moved to dismiss, arguing that Congress lacked constitutionalauthority to enact Section 13981 and that Brzonkala failed to state a claimunder Section 13981. The United States intervened to defend the constitutionalityof the statute. App. 8a-9a, 217a.6
In July 1996, the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The courtinitially recognized that, because Brzonkala had stated a claim under Section13981 at least against Morrison, the constitutional question would haveto be decided. App. 361a-362a. The court then concluded that Congress lackedthe constitutional authority to enact Section 13981.
The court held that Section 13981 was not a proper exercise of Congress'spower under the Commerce Clause. App. 369a-382a. The court acknowledgedthe existence of "congressional findings which support that violenceagainst women affects interstate commerce." Id. at 371a. However, notwithstandingthe absence of such congressional findings in United States v. Lopez, 514U.S. 549 (1995), the court concluded that Section 13981 was not meaningfullydistinguishable from the statute struck down in Lopez.
The court also held that Section 13981 was not a proper exercise of Congress'spower to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The court recognized that "[s]omepossibility exists that at least part of the states' differential treatmentof gender-based violent crimes against women is due to gender discrimination,and so correcting the differential treatment arising out of gender discriminationis a legitimate Fourteenth Amendment concern." App. 399a. But the courtconcluded that "no reasonable possibility exists that VAWA will helpremedy this legitimate Fourteenth Amendment concern," because "VAWAis tailored to remedy conduct other than the conduct giving rise to theequal protection concern," i.e., the conduct of individual perpetratorsof gender-motivated violence. Id. at 400a.

5. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed. App. 282a-349a. The courtheld that Section 13981 was a valid exercise of Congress's power under theCommerce Clause, id. at 340a, and consequently did not reach the FourteenthAmendment question. Judge Luttig dissented, urging that the case was controlledby Lopez. Id. at 349a.

6. On rehearing en banc, a divided court of appeals affirmed the judgmentof the district court, holding that Congress did not have the power to enactSection 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment. App. 1a- 281a.
a. On the Commerce Clause question, the en banc court acknowledged that"[t]he legislative record in this case, considered as a whole, showsthat violence against women is a sobering problem and also that such violenceultimately does take a toll on the national economy." App. 68a. Thecourt likewise recognized that "Congress' specific findings regardingthe relationship between gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce* * * depict the manner in which such violence affects interstate commerce."Id. at 68a-69a.
The court nonetheless concluded that Section 13981 could not be sustainedunder Congress's power to regulate activities substantially affecting interstatecommerce. The court understood Lopez to hold that Congress cannot regulatean activity as substantially affecting interstate commerce unless (1) theregulated activity is itself an economic one or (2) the statute includesa jurisdictional element requiring a case-by-case inquiry into the nexusto interstate commerce. App. 15a-31a. Because Section 13981 "neitherregulates an economic activity nor includes a jurisdictional element,"the court concluded that "it cannot be upheld on the authority of Lopezor any other Supreme Court holding demarcating the outer limits of Congress'power under the substantially affects test." Id. at 31a.
Alternatively, the court of appeals held that Section 13981 could not besustained under the commerce power "[e]ven if these two categoriesof permissible congressional regulations demarcate not the absolute, butonly the presumptive outer limits of congressional power under the substantiallyaffects test." App. 31a-32a. Noting Lopez's admonition that the commercepower cannot be construed in a manner that would "effectually obliteratethe distinction between what is national and what is local and create acompletely centralized government," id. at 33a (quoting Lopez, 514U.S. at 557), the court concluded that Section 13981 presents the same federalismconcerns as did the statute at issue in Lopez. App. 31a-51a. In the court'sview, Section 13981 could not be upheld without endorsing an unlimited viewof the commerce power that would permit Congress to "assume controlover the entire field of violent crime, or, for that matter, all crime withinall of the States." Id. at 89a.
b. The court of appeals also held that Section 13981 could not be sustainedas legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, i.e., legislation remedyingbias in state civil and criminal justice systems against victims of gender-motivatedviolence. The court reasoned that Section 13981 "is invalid, regardlessof whether its end is to remedy unconstitutional state action, for the simplereason that it regulates purely private conduct and is not limited to individualcases in which the state has violated the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendmentrights." App. 126a. The court stated that its conclusion was compelledby United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), and the Civil Rights Cases,109 U.S. 3 (1883). App. 104a-126a.
The court of appeals also held that Section 13981 did not satisfy the requirementarticulated in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997), of "congruenceand proportionality between the [constitutional] injury to be preventedor remedied and the means adopted to that end." First, the court expresseddoubt that the legislative record revealed constitutional violations tobe remedied. App. 153a-160a. Although acknowledging that the record "doesestablish that the States enforce and apply certain laws in a manner thatmay ultimately prevent the victims of gender-motivated violence from obtainingvindication through the criminal or civil systems," the court questionedwhether such conduct amounted to "purposeful discrimination againstwomen in the enforcement of facially neutral laws that could give rise toan equal protection violation." Id. at 153a. Second, the court concludedthat Section 13981 was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to remedy theasserted constitutional wrongs. Id. at 160a-163a. For example, said thecourt, Section 13981 applies in "all States and jurisdictions withoutregard to the adequacy of their enforcement efforts, substantive laws, orevidentiary rules and procedures, and does so without any time limit ortermination mechanism." Id. at 162a.7
c. Judge Motz, writing for the four dissenting judges, concluded that Section13981 was a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.App. 210a-281a. The dissent concluded that Congress had the requisite rationalbasis, as reflected in the "detailed and extensive" legislativefindings and testimony, id. at 229a, to determine that "gender-basedviolence substantially affects interstate commerce," id. at 237a. Thedissent found no support in Lopez for limiting Congress's commerce powerto statutes that regulate economic activities or contain a jurisdictionalelement. Id. at 240a-247a.
The dissent also rejected the majority's conclusion that federalism concernsundermined Section 13981, noting that Congress had "explicitly foundthat the states refused or were unable to deal effectively with the problemscreated by gender-based violence." App. 232a. Thus, the dissent explained,Section 13981 "provides a necessary national remedy for a severe problemthat the states have, by their own admission, been unable to address effectively."Id. at 278a. The dissent concluded that Section 13981, in contrast to thestatute in Lopez, did not "add[] a redundant layer of federal regulationin an area where most states had already acted," but instead "respondedto the states' self-described needs." Id. at 276a.

The court of appeals struck down 42 U.S.C. 13981, the civil rights provisionof the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, as exceeding Congress's constitutionalpower to regulate interstate commerce or to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.That decision misconstrues this Court's precedents and places unwarrantedlimits on Congress's authority to address a national problem of the firstmagnitude. Certiorari is warranted to review the court of appeals' "exerciseof the grave power of annulling an Act of Congress," United Statesv. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 65 (1965), and to consider a question of exceptionalimportance concerning the scope of Congress's constitutional powers, seeUnited States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
Although no other court of appeals has had occasion to address the constitutionalityof Section 13981, and therefore no conflict yet exists in the circuits,the en banc Fourth Circuit itself was sharply divided, with seven judgesconcluding that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact Section13981 and four judges concluding otherwise. Moreover, the majority's decisionconflicts with 14 district court rulings that have rejected constitutionalchallenges to Section 13981.8 Three of those district courts, as well asone state court, did so after the Fourth Circuit's en banc decision in thiscase.9
The court of appeals' decision also warrants review because it adopts anunduly restrictive view of the reach of Congress's powers under both theCommerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, reading into Lopez and Cityof Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), limits on those powers that aremore stringent than any expressly imposed by this Court. The Court shouldtherefore grant review both to consider the constitutionality of Section13981 and to clarify the extent of congressional power under the CommerceClause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. The court of appeals held that Congress lacked authority under the CommerceClause to address a problem with a substantial impact on the national economythat was extensively documented in four years of congressional hearings.The court concluded that Congress, in the exercise of its Commerce Clausepowers, may adopt only statutes that directly regulate economic activityor that contain an express jurisdictional element. App. 15a-31a. The courtfurther concluded that Section 13981 improperly intruded into a regulatorysphere reserved to the States. Id. at 31a-51a.
The court of appeals' decision reflects a misunderstanding of Lopez. TheCourt in Lopez did, of course, decline to undertake a series of inferentialleaps to supply a connection between non-economic activity and interstatecommerce that had not been identified by Congress itself. The Court neversuggested, however, that Congress's commerce power does not extend to theregulation of non-economic activity when a significant impact on interstatecommerce is made plain by the sort of congressional findings and extensivelegislative record assembled in support of VAWA.
Moreover, while Lopez counsels that the judiciary should inquire into whetheran exercise of the commerce power to regulate non-economic activity intrudeson state spheres of authority, that inquiry confirms the validity of Section13981. Congress enacted VAWA, including its civil rights provision, in responseto the States' systemic failure, recognized by the States themselves, toaddress adequately the problem of gender-motivated violence. Congress violatedno principle of federalism in seeking to vindicate the rights of victimsof gender-motivated violence in the face of such systemic discrimination.When the States fail to resolve a problem that has a substantial impacton the national economy, the Constitution does not leave Congress powerlessto act.
1. In Lopez, this Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,Pub. L. No. 101-647, Title XVII, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4844, which madeit a crime to possess any firearm near a school. The Court observed thatthe statute neither regulated an economic activity nor contained a jurisdictionalelement. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551, 561-562. The Court did not treat thosefeatures as dispositive, however. To the contrary, the Court reaffirmedthat "[e]ven if [an] activity be local and though it may not be regardedas commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress ifit exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." Id.at 556 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)). Accordingly,the Lopez Court proceeded to evaluate what effect, if any, the regulatedactivity in that case had on interstate commerce.
The Court observed that "[n]either the statute nor its legislativehistory contain[ed] express congressional findings regarding the effectsupon interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone." 514 U.S.at 562 (citation omitted). Although "Congress normally is not requiredto make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity hason interstate commerce," the Court explained, such findings "wouldenable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in questionsubstantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantialeffect was visible to the naked eye." Id. at 562, 563.10
Without the benefit of a legislative record, the Court noted that it couldnot sustain the Gun-Free School Zones Act as a valid regulation of interstatecommerce without "pil[ing] inference upon inference." 514 U.S.at 567. It would have had to conclude that possession of a gun in a schoolzone (1) might lead to violent crime, (2) which might threaten the learningprocess, (3) which might ultimately produce less productive citizens, (4)which might, cumulatively, impair the national economy. See id. at 563-564(describing the government's argument); id. at 565 (describing the dissent'sargument). The Court declined to find the requisite "substantial effect"on commerce based on such an unsubstantiated chain of inferences.
The Court observed that it had been offered no rationale to uphold the Gun-FreeSchool Zones Act that was not capable of infinite expansion. 514 U.S. at564 (finding it "difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power,even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where Stateshistorically have been sovereign"). The Court therefore concluded thatfederalism principles prevented it from reaching a result that would "obliteratethe distinction between what is national and what is local." Id. at567 (quoting United States v. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495,554 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring)).
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which Justice O'Connor joined, likewise emphasizedfederalism concerns. However, like the opinion of the Court, the concurrencedid not propose to enforce federalism-based limits by restricting Congress'scommerce power to the regulation of economic activity. Instead, the concurrenceexplicitly presumed that Congress may, in some circumstances, regulate non-commercialactivity. The concurrence urged that if "neither the [regulated] actorsnor their conduct has a commercial character, and neither the purposes northe design of the statute has an evident commercial nexus," then acourt should "inquire whether the exercise of national power seeksto intrude upon an area of traditional state concern." 514 U.S. at580. In other words, a court should ask whether principles of federalismcall such a statute into question.

2. a. While the connection between gun possession near schools and interstatecommerce was viewed by the Lopez court as attenuated, the connection betweengender-motivated violence and interstate commerce is direct and expresslyestablished in VAWA's extensive legislative record. See pp. 7-8, supra.
Congress found, among other things, that violence against women "deter[s]potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in employmentin interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in placesinvolved, in interstate commerce." Conf. Rep. 385; see also 1993 S.Rep. 54 (finding that actual and feared gender-based violence "restrictsmovement, reduces employment opportunities, increases health expenditures,and reduces consumer spending"). The legislative record establishesthat violence against women affects interstate commerce in ways that aredirect and immediate. For example, "almost 50 percent of rape victimslose their jobs or are forced to quit because of the crime's severity."1991 S. Rep. 53. The cost of employee absenteeism resulting from domesticviolence is estimated at between $3 billion and $5 billion annually, 1990S. Judiciary Hearings, Pt. 1, at 58, and the total cost of domestic violence,including "health care, criminal justice, and other social costs,"is estimated at between $5 billion and $10 billion annually, 1993 S. Rep.41. See also 1990 S. Rep. 37 (noting toll of domestic violence in employeeabsenteeism, medical costs, and homelessness).
As the Court explained in Lopez, such findings are particularly significantwhere, as here, the connection between an activity and interstate commercemay not be "visible to the naked eye." 514 U.S. at 563. Indeed,the problem of gender-motivated violence itself has long been overlooked.See 1991 S. Rep. 38 ("We have underestimated the problem not only becauseof faulty statistical measures, but also because the sheer volume of thesecrimes dulls our sensitivity to the victims."). Women have often beenshamed into silence about rape, domestic abuse, and other violent crimes-andthe impact of such crimes upon their lives-because of the attitudes of societygenerally and even of the police, prosecutors, and court personnel assignedto deal with such crimes. See, e.g., 1990 S. Rep. 33-34. The extensive findingsreveal both the extent of the underlying problem and its substantial effecton interstate commerce.
Unlike in Lopez, then, the Court has no need to "pile inference oninference" to sustain Section 13981. To the contrary, in order to invalidatethe statute, the Court would have to set aside Congress's findings of adirect nexus between gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce.
b. Nor does an inquiry into "whether the exercise of national power[to regulate local non-economic activity] seeks to intrude upon an areaof traditional state concern," Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J.,concurring), require the invalidation of Section 13981. Again, the differencebetween this case and Lopez is stark.
In the Lopez Court's view, the Gun-Free School Zones Act "inappropriatelyoverr[ode] legitimate State firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federallaw." 514 U.S. at 561 n.3 (quoting Statement of President George Bushon Signing the Crime Control Act of 1990, 26 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1944,1945 (Nov. 29, 1990)). The Court found no indication that the Act addresseda problem that could not adequately be addressed by the States. See id.at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that "over 40 States alreadyhave criminal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near schoolgrounds").
In sharp contrast, Congress enacted Section 13981 to redress a problem thatwas caused, in part, by pervasive failures in the States' justice systems.See pp. 8-11, supra. If a regulated activity poses a substantial threatto interstate commerce, and the States cannot or will not adequately addressthat threat, federalism principles should not require the problem to gounresolved. Cf. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,452 U.S. 264, 281-282 (1981) (in upholding Congress's authority under theCommerce Clause to impose national environmental standards for intrastatecoal mining, the Court noted the congressional finding that States mightfail to impose similarly rigorous standards out of concern for protectinglocal economic interests).
A statute premised on systemic state failure of this kind does not presagean open-ended expansion of federal power into domains properly reservedto the States. As the dissent below explained, "nothing more clearlyillustrates the basic difference" between the statutes in this caseand Lopez than that Section 13981 "responded to the states' self-describedneeds, while the [Gun-Free School Zones Act] added a redundant layer offederal regulation in an area where most states had already acted."App. 276a.
Moreover, Section 13981 is particularly respectful of federalism concernsand does not intrude into the operation of state government. Section 13981displaces no state law. To the contrary, the statute incorporates by referenceexisting definitions of prohibited activity, see 42 U.S.C. 13981(d)(2),and simply provides a new civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated crime.11The federalism concerns that animated the Court's decision in Lopez thusdo not require the invalidation of Section 13981.
B. 1. Section 13981 is also a valid exercise of Congress's power to enforcethe Fourteenth Amendment. As this Court recently reaffirmed, "[i]tis for Congress in the first instance to 'determin[e] whether and what legislationis needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,' and itsconclusions are entitled to much deference." Flores, 521 U.S. at 536(quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)). The Court alsoreaffirmed that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress broaddiscretion in choosing the means to enforce those guarantees. See id. at517-518; see also Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650 (Section 5 gives Congress "thesame broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause").
This Court has made clear that the question whether legislation falls withinthe scope of Congress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendmentis distinct from the question whether particular conduct violates Section1. Thus, "[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violationscan fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in theprocess it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudesinto 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.'"Flores, 521 U.S. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455(1976)). However, "as broad as the congressional enforcement poweris, it is not unlimited." Ibid. (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.112, 128 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.)). As this Court has explained, theSection 5 power is "remedial," not "substantive." Id.at 519. Congress may not enact legislation that "alters the meaning"of the Constitution, ibid., because its Section 5 power is "correctiveor preventive, not definitional," id. at 525.
The Flores Court thus held that Congress had exceeded its Section 5 powerin enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C.2000bb et seq., which the Court viewed as an apparent attempt to redefinethe substantive scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 521 U.S. at 532.RFRA was adopted in direct response to this Court's decision in EmploymentDivision v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held that the States did notneed a compelling justification to apply neutral, generally applicable lawsthat substantially burdened religious practices. The express purpose ofRFRA was to reimpose the compelling interest test. Flores, 521 U.S. at 515-516.Because Section 5 gives Congress the power only to "enforce"-notto "attempt a substantive change in" (id. at 532)-constitutionalrights, the Court held that Congress had exceeded its Section 5 power inenacting RFRA (see id. at 529-536).

2. Section 13981, unlike RFRA, cannot be viewed as an attempt to effect"a substantive change in constitutional protections." Flores,521 U.S. 532. To the contrary, Section 13981 provides a remedy for recognizedconstitutional violations by state officials and other state actors, includingpolice, prosecutors and judges. Based in part on the States' own studies,Congress found that "bias and discrimination in the [state] criminaljustice system often deprive[] victims of crimes of violence motivated bygender of equal protection of the laws and the redress to which they areentitled." Conf. Rep. 385; see pp. 8-11, supra (discussing supportingmaterials).
Nevertheless, relying on United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), andthe Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the court of appeals ruled thatSection 13981 "is invalid, regardless of whether its end is to remedyunconstitutional state action, for the simple reason that it regulates purelyprivate conduct and is not limited to individual cases in which the statehas violated the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights." App. 126a.The court misread this Court's Reconstruction-era decisions, which do notbar Congress from reaching the conduct of private persons, provided thatCongress does so in order to remedy discrimination by the State or its agents.
In Harris, the Court struck down a statute that was premised on the explicitassumption that purely private conduct could violate the Fourteenth Amendment.The statute at issue, Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22,17 Stat. 13, outlawed conspiracies among private persons to deprive anyperson of the equal protection of the law. The explicit predicate for theapplication of the statute was a finding that private persons had committedan equal protection violation.
The statute at issue in the Civil Rights Cases similarly purported to extendthe affirmative requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment directly to privateparties. The Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, establisheda right to be free of private discrimination in public accommodations. See109 U.S. at 9. The Court explained that the critical flaw in the statutewas that it did "not profess to be corrective of any constitutionalwrong committed by the States"; instead, the statute "step[ped]into the domain of local jurisprudence, and [laid] down rules for the conductof individuals in society towards each other, and impose[d] sanctions forthe enforcement of those rules, without referring in any manner to any supposedaction of the State or its authorities." Id. at 14.
Although Congress may not determine that private conduct itself violatesthe Fourteenth Amendment, nothing in this Court's precedents bars Congressfrom regulating private conduct in order to provide a remedy for unconstitutionalstate action. To the contrary, as Congress declared in enacting VAWA: "Whilethe 14th amendment itself only covers actions by the States, Congress'spower to enforce the amendment includes the power to create a private remedyas the most effective means to fight public discrimination." 1993 S.Rep. 55 n.72 (citing Morgan, 384 U.S. 641; District of Columbia v. Carter,409 U.S. 418, 423, 424 n.8 (1973) (that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendmentitself 'erects no shield against merely private conduct' * * * is not tosay * * * that Congress may not proscribe purely private conduct under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment")).
Unlike the statutes invalidated by the Reconstruction-era Court, Section13981 is not premised on the assumption that private conduct can violatethe Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, Section 13981 compensates for discriminationin the state justice systems. It affords victims of gender-motivated violencea measure of the vindication and compensation that are often denied themby biased state actors. Section 13981 is thus "corrective legislation;that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such lawsas the States may adopt or enforce, and which, by the [Fourteenth] amendment,they are prohibiting from making or enforcing, or such acts or proceedingsas the states may commit or take, and which by the amendment they are prohibitedfrom committing or taking." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13-14 (quotedin part in Flores, 521 U.S. at 525).

3. The court of appeals alternatively ruled that Section 13981, like thestatute at issue in Flores, "is so out of proportion to any possibleunconstitutional state action at which it might conceivably be aimed asto exceed congressional power to 'enforce' the Fourteenth Amendment."App. 160a. Again, the court misconstrued a decision of this Court.
The government in Flores advanced one legitimate constitutional end forRFRA: to prevent the enforcement of state laws that, although neutral ontheir face, were enacted with the unconstitutional object of targeting religiouspractices. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 529. The Court concluded,

however, that there was insufficient evidence in RFRA's legislative recordof generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry. See id.at 530 ("The history of [religious] persecution in this country detailedin the hearings mention[ed] no episodes occurring in the past 40 years.").The Court also stressed RFRA's "[s]weeping coverage [that] ensuresits intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibitingofficial actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter."Id. at 532. The Court found that such "congressional intrusion intothe States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate forthe health and welfare of theirs citizens," id. at 534, was "soout of proportion" to the proffered constitutional end that RFRA couldnot "be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutionalbehavior," id. at 532.
Section 13981 suffers from neither of the defects identified by this Courtin Flores. The legislative record leaves no doubt that Section 13981 wasenacted for a purpose within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment: toremedy conscious bias against victims of sexual assault, domestic abuse,and other violent crimes that has been found to exist currently in statecivil and criminal justice systems throughout the nation. It affords suchvictims "an opportunity for legal vindication that [the victim], notthe State, controls"-an opportunity that may be exercised in federalcourt "with judges insulated from local political pressures and thepower to screen out jurors who harbor irrational prejudices against, forexample, rape victims." 1990 S. Rep. 42. That remedy provided by Sections13981 is, moreover, entirely unintrusive as to the States. Unlike RFRA,Section 13981 displaces no state law and prohibits no state action. Instead,Section 13981 simply provides a federal remedy to those whose injuries couldotherwise go unvindicated in state court.
* * *
In sum, Congress correctly concluded that its power to enact Section 13981,VAWA's civil rights remedy, "is firmly based on the Commerce Clauseand on section 5 of the 14th Amendment." 1993 S. Rep. 54. Because thecourt of appeals invalidated a federal statute and imposed new limits onthe scope of congressional power, this Court's review is warranted.