SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
TEXAS ET AL. v. FRANÇOIS DANIEL LESAGE
AND UNITED STATES
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-1111. Decided November 29, 1999 
   PER CURIAM.
   Respondent François Daniel Lesage, an African immi-
grant of Caucasian descent, applied for admission to the 
Ph. D. program in counseling psychology at the University 
of Texas' Department of Education for the 1996-1997 
academic year.  In the year Lesage applied, the school 
received 223 applications for the program and offered 
admission to roughly 20 candidates.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 
A-22.  It is undisputed that the school considered the race 
of its applicants at some stage during the review process.  
The school rejected Lesage's application and offered ad-
mission to at least one minority candidate.  Lesage filed 
suit seeking money damages and injunctive relief.  He 
alleged that, by establishing and maintaining a race-
conscious admissions process, the school had violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and Rev. Stat. S1977, 42 U. S. C. S1981, Rev. Stat. S1979, 
as amended, 42 U. S. C. S1983 (1994 ed., Supp. III), and 78 
Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. S2000d.
   Petitioners sought summary judgment, offering evidence 
that, even if the school's admissions process had been 
completely colorblind, Lesage would not have been admit-
ted.  At least 80 applicants had higher undergraduate 
grade point averages (GPA's) than Lesage, 152 applicants 
had higher Graduate Record Examination (GRE) scores, 
and 73 applicants had both higher GPA's and higher GRE 
scores.  App. to Pet. for Cert. A-23.  In an affidavit, Pro-
fessor Ricardo Ainslie, one of two members of the school's 
admissions committee, stated that Lesage's personal 
statement indicated that he had " 'a rather superficial 
interest in the field with a limited capacity to convey his 
interests and ideas,' " and that his letters of recommenda-
tion were "weak."  Id., at A-24.  Ainslie stated that 
Lesage's application was rejected early in the review 
process, when the committee was winnowing the full 
application pool to a list of 40.  Ibid.  The District Court 
concluded that "any consideration of race had no effect on 
this particular individual's rejection," and that there was 
"uncontested evidence that the students ultimately admit-
ted to the program ha[d] credentials that the committee 
considered superior to Respondent's."  Id., at A-26 to A-
27.  It therefore granted summary judgment for petitioners 
with respect to all of Lesage's claims for relief.
   The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.  158 
F. 3d 213 (1998).  The court did not review the District 
Court's conclusion that there was no genuine issue as to 
whether the school would have rejected Lesage under a 
colorblind admissions process.  Instead, it held that such a 
determination was "irrelevant to the pertinent issue on 
summary judgment, namely, whether the State violated 
Lesage's constitutional rights by rejecting his application 
in the course of operating a racially discriminatory admis-
sions program."  Id., at 222.  An applicant who was re-
jected at a stage of the review process that was race con-
scious, the court reasoned, has "suffered an implied 
injury"-the inability to compete on an equal footing.  
Ibid.  Because there remained a factual dispute as to 
whether the stage of review during which Lesage's appli-
cation was eliminated was in some way race conscious, the 
court held that summary judgment was inappropriate and 
remanded the case for trial.  Ibid.
   Insofar as the Court of Appeals held that summary 
judgment was inappropriate on Lesage's S1983 action 
seeking damages for the school's rejection of his applica-
tion for the 1996-1997 academic year even if petitioners 
conclusively established that Lesage would have been 
rejected under a race-neutral policy, its decision is incon-
sistent with this Court's well-established framework for 
analyzing such claims.  Under Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. 
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977), even if the government has 
considered an impermissible criterion in making a deci-
sion adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat 
liability by demonstrating that it would have made the 
same decision absent the forbidden consideration.  See id., 
at 287.  See also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U. S. 574, 593 
(1998); Board of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr, 518 
U. S. 668, 675 (1996).  Our previous decisions on this point 
have typically involved alleged retaliation for protected 
First Amendment activity rather than racial discrimina-
tion, but that distinction is immaterial.  The underlying 
principle is the same: The government can avoid liability 
by proving that it would have made the same decision 
without the impermissible motive.  
   Simply put, where a plaintiff challenges a discrete 
governmental decision as being based on an impermissible 
criterion and it is undisputed that the government would 
have made the same decision regardless, there is no cogni-
zable injury warranting relief under S1983.  
   Of course, a plaintiff who challenges an ongoing race-
conscious program and seeks forward-looking relief need 
not affirmatively establish that he would receive the bene-
fit in question if race were not considered.  The relevant 
injury in such cases is "the inability to compete on an 
equal footing."  Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. 
Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 666 
(1993).  See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 
U. S. 200, 211 (1995).  But where there is no allegation of 
an ongoing or imminent constitutional violation to support 
a claim for forward-looking relief, the government's con-
clusive demonstration that it would have made the same 
decision absent the alleged discrimination precludes any 
finding of liability.    
   Lesage's second amended complaint sought injunctive 
relief and alleged that petitioners "have established and 
are maintaining, under color of the laws of the State of 
Texas, an affirmative action admissions program at the 
College of Education that classifies applicants on the basis 
of race and ethnicity."  App. to Pet. for Cert. A-22 (empha-
sis added).  But in deciding that summary judgment was 
improper, the Court of Appeals did not distinguish be-
tween Lesage's retrospective claim for damages and his 
forward-looking claim for injunctive relief based on con-
tinuing discrimination.  Further, in their petition for 
certiorari, petitioners assert that "[t]he case at bar differs 
from Adarand because there is no allegation that the 
department of counseling psychology continues to use 
race-based admissions subsequent to the Fifth Circuit's 
Hopwood v. State of Texas[, 78 F. 3d 932, cert. denied, 518 
U. S. 1033 (1996),] decision."  Pet. for Cert 13.  The brief in 
opposition does not contest this statement.  It therefore 
appears, although we do not decide, that Lesage has 
abandoned any claim that the school is presently adminis-
tering a discriminatory admissions process.  
   Insofar as the Court of Appeals held that petitioners 
were not entitled to summary judgment on Lesage's S1983 
claim for damages relating to the rejection of his applica-
tion for the 1996-1997 academic year even if he would 
have been denied admission under a race-neutral policy, 
its decision contradicts our holding in Mt. Healthy.  We 
therefore grant the petition for writ of certiorari and re-
verse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this respect.
   Lesage also asserted claims under 42 U. S. C. SS1981 
and 2000d (Title VI).  Whether these claims remain, and 
whether Lesage has abandoned his claim for injunctive 
relief on the ground that petitioners are continuing to 
operate a discriminatory admissions process, are matters 
open on remand.  The case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
   It is so ordered.