Briefs:
Parties
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Phil Crawford, Interim Field Office Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al., v. Sergio S. Martinez
No. 03-878
Daniel Benitez v. Robert A. Wallis, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service
No. 03-7434
Subject:
Detention of Permanent Resident Aliens, Removal, Deportation, Immigration Law
Question:
Whether [8 U.S.C.] Section 1231(a)(6) and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)
compel the release of an arriving alien who was
apprehended at the border of the United States, denied
admission, and ordered removed from the United
States.
Decisions:
- U.S. Court of Appeals - 11th Circuit
 (Benitez v. Wallis), Opinion Filed: July 17, 2003
- U.S. Court of Appeals - 9th Circuit, (Martinez v. Smith), Unpublished Order Filed: August 18, 2003
- United States Supreme Court, Case No. 03-878, Cert. Granted: March 1, 2004
- United States Supreme Court, Case No. 03-3474, Cert. Granted: January 16, 2004
Resources:
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Briefs:
Parties
Amicus - Supporting Petitioner Benitez (No. 03-7434)
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Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al. v. William D. Dotson, et al.
No. 03-287
Subject:
Questions:
This petition arises from one of the many cases considering which prisoner
claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck holds
that a prisoner cannot advance a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where
success on that claim would "necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction
or sentence...unless...the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated." Id. at 487. This is Heck's so-called "favorable termination
requirement."
The Sixth Circuit concluded below that Heck's favorable termination
requirement does not cover claims challenging parole procedures because
success on those claims would not necessarily guarantee speedier release,
but instead would provide only a new parole hearing. This raises the
following questions:
- When a prisoner invokes § 1983 to challenge parole proceedings, does
Heck v. Humphrey's favorable termination requirement apply where success
by the prisoner on the claim would result only in a new parole hearing and
not necessarily guarantee earlier release from prison?
- Does a federal court judgment ordering a new parole hearing "necessarily
imply the invalidity of" the decision at the previous parole hearing for
purposes of Heck v. Humphrey?
Decisions:
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Parties
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Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., et al.
No. 02-1028
Subject:
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA"), Contracts
Questions:
- Whether a cargo owner that contracts with a freight forwarder for
transportation of goods to a destination in the United States is bound by the
contracts that the freight forwarder makes with carriers to provide that
transportation.
- Whether federal maritime law requires that terms of a bill of lading
extending liability limitations under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
("COGSA"), 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315, to "independent contractors"
used to perform the contract of transportation must be narrowly construed
to cover only those independent contractors in privity of contract with the
bill's issuer .
Decisions:
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Briefs:
Parties
Amicus - Supporting Petitioner
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Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.
No. 02-1192
Subject:
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), Contribution, Clean-Up Costs, Environmental Law
Question:
Whether a private party who has not been the subject of an underlying civil
action pursuant to CERCLA Sections 106 or 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 or 9607,
may bring an action seeking contribution pursuant to CERCLA Section
113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), to recover costs spent voluntarily to clean
up properties contaminated by hazardous substances.
Decisions:
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Briefs:
Amicus - Supporting Petitioner
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KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impressions, Inc., et al.
No. 03-409
Subject:
Trademark Infringement, Fair Use, Intellectual Property
Question:
Does the classic fair use defense to trademark infringement require the party
asserting the defense to demonstrate an absence of likelihood of confusion,
as is the rule in the 9th Circuit, or is Fair Use an absolute defense,
irrespective of whether or not confusion may result, as is the rule in other
Circuits?
Decisions:
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John F. Kowalski, Judge, 26th Judicial Circuit Court of Michigan, et al. v. John C. Tesmer, et al.
No. 03-407
Subject:
Guilty Plea, Right to Appellate Counsel, Fourteenth Amendment, Third-Party Standing, Criminal Law
Questions:
The Michigan Constitution, Mich Const 1963, art I, § 20, provides that a
criminal defendant who pleads guilty shall not have an appeal of right and
shall have a right to appointed appellate counsel "as provided by law." A
Michigan statute, Michigan Compiled Law (MCL) 770.3a, provides, with
significant listed exceptions, that criminal defendants who plead guilty shall
not have appointed appellate counsel for discretionary appeals for review of
the defendant's conviction or sentence.
- Does the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee a right to an appointed
appellate attorney in a discretionary first appeal of an indigent criminal
defendant convicted by a guilty plea?
- Do attorneys have third-party standing on behalf of potential future
indigent criminal defendants to make a constitutional challenge to a state
statute prohibiting appointment of appellate counsel in discretionary first
appeals following convictions by guilty pleas where the federal courts
properly abstained from hearing the claims of indigent criminal defendants
themselves?
Decisions:
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Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Bradley Nigh
No. 03-377
Subject:
Question:
Whether the $1,000 statutory limit originally adopted in 1968 as a cap on
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) recoveries under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i)
has been rendered inapplicable to that subpart by subsequent amendments
to Section 1640(a)(2)(A) -- though there is no evidence of any Congressional
intent to effect such a change -- so that parties who suffer no actual
damages may now recover far in excess of the previous $1,000 cap.
Decisions:
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Briefs:
Amicus - Supporting Petitioner
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Donald P. Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center v. Christopher Simmons
No. 03-633
Subject:
Minimum Age for Capital Punishment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment
Questions:
The Supreme Court of Missouri departed from this Court's holding in Stanford
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), in which the Court upheld statutes under
which the minimum age for capital punishment is sixteen. The Missouri
court's decision raises two questions:
- Once this Court holds that a particular punishment is not "cruel and
unusual" and thus barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, can a
lower court reach a contrary decision based on its own analysis of evolving
standards?
- Is the imposition of the death penalty on a person who commits a murder
at age seventeen "cruel and unusual," and thus barred by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments?
Decisions:
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Briefs:
Parties
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Keyse G. Jama v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
No. 03-674
Subject:
Removal of Aliens, Acceptance by Foreign Country
Question:
Whether the Attorney General can remove an alien to one of the countries
designated in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E) without obtaining that country's
acceptance of the alien prior to removal.
Decisions:
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Parties
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Willard Stewart v. Dutra Construction Company
No. 03-814
Subject:
Jones Act, "Seaman" Status, Special Purpose Watercraft
Question:
To qualify for "seaman" status under the Jones Act, a worker must have an
"employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation." Chandris, Inc. v.
Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 357 (1995). What is the legal standard for determining
whether a special purpose watercraft (such as a dredge) is a Jones Act
"vessel"?
Decisions:
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Garrison S. Johnson v. James Gomez, et al.
No. 03-636
Subject:
Temporary Racial Segregation of State Prisoners, Equal Protection Clause
Questions:
- Is a state's practice of routine racial segregation of state prisoners for at
least a 60-day period subject to the same strict scrutiny generally applicable
to all other challenges to intentional racial segregation, or is it excused from
such scrutiny and subject only to the more relaxed review afforded under
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)?
- Does California's practice of routine racial segregation of state prisoners
for at least a 60-day period violate the Equal Protection Clause?
Decisions:
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Parties
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State of Florida v. Joe Elton Nixon
No. 03-931
Subject:
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Defense Strategy, Death Penalty, Criminal Procedure
Questions:
In a capital murder case, the Florida Supreme Court:
- applied an incorrect standard, contrary to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) and Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (2000), by finding defense counsel ineffective per se
under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) despite having found counsel's strategy not to contest overwhelming evidence of guilt but to vigorously contest the sentence in the defendant's best interest and reasonably calculated to avoid a death sentence, and
- erred in concluding that Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) prohibited trial counsel from adopting a strategy, after fully informing his client, without objection, not to contest overwhelming evidence of guilt to protect the best interest of his client in contesting the appropriateness of
imposing the death penalty.
Decisions:
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Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, et al. v. Tommy G. Thompson, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.
No. 02-1472
Tommy G. Thompson, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma
No. 03-853
Subject:
Questions:
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, et al. v. Thompson, et al., No. 02-1472
- Whether the federal government can repudiate, without liability, express
contractual commitments for which it has received valuable consideration,
either by spending down discretionary agency appropriations otherwise
available to pay its contracts, or simply by changing the law and the
contracts retroactively.
- Whether government contract payment rights that are contingent on "the
availability of appropriations" vest when an agency receives a lump-sum
appropriation that is legally available to pay the contracts — as is the law of
the Federal Circuit under Blackhawk Heating — or is the government's
liability calculated only at the end of the year after the agency has spent its
appropriations on other activities, as the Tenth Circuit ruled below.
Thompson v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, No. 03-853
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), 25
U.S.C. §§ 450-450n, authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(the Secretary) to enter into contracts with Indian Tribes for the
administration of programs the Secretary otherwise would administer
himself. The ISDA also provides that the Secretary shall pay "contract
support costs" to cover certain direct and indirect expenses incurred by the
Tribes in administering those contracts. The ISDA, however, makes payment
"subject to the availability of appropriations," and declares that the Secretary
"is not required to reduce funding for programs, projects or activities serving
a tribe to make funds available" for contract support and other selfdetermination
contract costs. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-l(b). The questions presented
are:
- Whether the ISDA requires the Secretary to pay contract support costs
associated with carrying out self-determination contracts with the Indian
Health Service, where appropriations were otherwise insufficient to fully fund
those costs and would require reprogramming funds needed for noncontractable,
inherently federal functions such as having an Indian Health
Service.
- Whether Section 314 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No.105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-
288, bars respondent from recovering its contract support costs.
Decisions:
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Briefs:
Parties - Cherokee Nation of Okla., et al. v. Thompson, et al., No. 02-1472
Parties - Thompson v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., No. 03-853
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Gary S. Small v. United States
No. 03-750
Subject:
Foreign Conviction, Unlawful Possession of Firearm, Criminal Law
Question:
The statute in question, § 922(g)(1) of Title 18, United States Code, makes it unlawful:
(g) . . . for any person
(1) who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year:
. . .
to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm.
In the instant matter, Petitioner's only conviction occurred in Okinawa, Japan, and it
was this Japanese conviction that served as the predicate felony in this § 922(g)(1)
prosecution. The Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment arguing that foreign
felonies were not intended to count as the term "in any court" means any court in the
United States. The motion was denied. While the Third Circuit's affirmance of the lower
court is consistent with a 1989 decision of the Fourth Circuit and a 1986 decision of the
Sixth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit in 2000 and the Second Circuit, on August 27, 2003, held
that foreign convictions do not count. Consequently, a clear conflict exists among the five
Circuit Courts which have addressed the issue.
The question presented, therefore, is whether the term "convicted in any court" contained
in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(i) includes convictions entered in foreign courts.
Decisions:
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Petition Phase
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Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Small:
Paul D. Boas
Pittsburgh, PA
For Respondent United States:
Theodore Olson
Solicitor General of the United States
Washington, DC
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Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. John W. Banks, II
No. 03-892
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sigitas J. Banaitis
No. 03-907
Subject:
Income Tax, Damages, Contingent Fee Agreement Included in Gross Income
Questions:
Whether, under Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 61(a), a
taxpayer's gross income from the proceeds of litigation includes the portion of his
damages recovery that is paid to his attorneys pursuant to a contingent fee agreement.
Decisions:
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Briefs:
Parties - Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Banks, No. 03-892
Parties - Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Banaitis, No. 03-907
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Azel P. Smith, et al. v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, et al.
No. 03-1160
Subject:
Question:
Should this Court grant certiorari to resolve the five-to-three circuit conflict over whether
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act?
Decisions:
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Parties
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David B. Pasquantino, et al. v. United States
No. 03-725
Subject:
Question:
Whether the federal wire fraud statute (18 U.S.C. § 1343) authorizes criminal prosecution
of an alleged fraudulent scheme to avoid payment of taxes potentially owed to a foreign
sovereign, given the lack of any clear statement by Congress to override the common law
revenue rule, the interests of both the Legislative and Executive Branches in guiding
foreign affairs, and this Court's prior rulings concerning the limited scope of the term
"property" as used in the wire fraud statute.
Decisions:
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Parties
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State of Illinois v. Roy I. Caballes
No. 03-923
Subject:
Traffic Stops, Drug-Detection Dogs, Reasonable Search, Fourth Amendment, Criminal Procedure
Question:
Whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify
using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop.
Decisions:
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Gerald Devenpeck, et al. v. Jerome Anthony Alford
No. 03-710
Subject:
Fourth Amendment, "Objective Reasonableness," Arrest, Probable Cause, Criminal Procedure
Questions:
Under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness test, an arrest is deemed
"reasonable" if there is probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred. Two
judicial circuits find an arrest reasonable if, based on an objective assessment by a reasonable
officer, there is probable cause to arrest for any offense. On the other hand, at least five
judicial circuits find an arrest to be reasonable only if there is probable cause to arrest for
crimes "closely related" to the crime or crimes articulated by the arresting officer. This case
presents the following questions:
- Does an arrest violate the Fourth Amendment when a police officer has probable cause to
make an arrest for one offense, if that offense is not closely related to the offense
articulated by the officer at the time of the arrest?
- For the purpose of qualified immunity, was the law clearly established when there was a
split in the circuits regarding the application of the "closely related offense doctrine", the
Ninth Circuit had no controlling authority applying the doctrine, and Washington state law
did not apply the doctrine?
Decisions:
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Claude M. Ballard, et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
No. 03-184
Estate of Kanter, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
No. 03-1034
Subject:
Questions:
Ballard, et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 03-184
In this case, the trial was conducted by a Special Trial Judge employed at will by the Tax Court.
The Special Trial Judge was required to create a report of factual and legal findings, but his
original report has never been made available to the parties, the public, or the reviewing Article
III courts. Instead, his superiors on the Tax Court either overruled his factual findings or
persuaded him to change his mind, thus creating a factual finding of tax fraud. This entire
process took place off the record, and came to light only in a subsequent conversation between
two Tax Court judges and a counsel for another party.
The questions presented are:
- Whether this secretive process is consistent with the Due Process Clause or the right to
effective Article III review?
- Whether this secretive process is consistent with 26 U.S.C. § 7482, which provides that
Article III courts must review Tax Court decisions just as they would decisions of a U.S.
district court?
Estate of Kanter, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 03-1034
The Tax Court keeps secret, even from the reviewing courts of appeals, the findings of fact and
credibility judgments of its special trial judges. By law, these trial judges are required to file
reports containing findings of fact and opinion with the Tax Court. Tax Ct. R. 183(b). By law,
these findings of fact "shall be presumed to be correct" and the Tax Court is required to give
"due regard" to the circumstance that the trial judge "had the opportunity to evaluate the
credibility of witnesses." Tax Ct. R. 183(c). Nonetheless, the Tax Court overturns the factual
findings, including the credibility findings, of its trial judges without the record revealing those
findings or that the Tax Court has overturned them. Secret trial judge reports preclude the
courts of appeals from determining whether the Tax Court has complied with the legal
constraints described above. Secret trial judge reports also preclude the courts of appeals from
reviewing a Tax Court decision on the basis of the entire record on which that decision in fact
rests. Federal statutes require that "all reports of the Tax Court * * * shall be public records."
26 U.S.C. § 7461(a).
The questions presented are:
- Whether the due process clause or the governing federal statutes require that the courts of
appeals be able to review Tax Court decisions on the basis of the complete record, including
the trial judge's findings of fact that, by law, the Tax Court must presume to be correct.
- Whether Tax Court Rule 183 requires judges of the Tax Court to uphold findings of fact and
credibility judgments made by their trial judges unless those findings are "clearly
erroneous," as the D.C. Circuit has held, or are those findings and credibility judgments
entitled to no deference at all, as the Seventh Circuit held in this case.
Decisions:
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Briefs:
Parties - Ballard, et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 03-184
Parties - Estate of Kanter, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 03-1034
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Thomas Goughnour, Acting Warden v. William C. Payton
No. 03-1039
Subject:
Capital Cases, Post-Crime Evidence, "Catch-All" Mitigation Instruction
Question:
- In Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990), this Court upheld the constitutionality
of California's "catch-all" mitigation instruction in capital cases, which directs a jury to
consider "any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though
it is not a legal excuse for the crime." The mitigating evidence at issue in Boyde was precrime
evidence in mitigation. Relying on Boyde, the California Supreme Court held that
California's "catch-all" mitigation instruction in this capital case is constitutional as applied
to post-crime evidence in mitigation. In a 6-5 decision, the en banc Ninth Circuit held that
the California Supreme Court decision was objectively unreasonable "because Boyde does
not control this case." The question presented is:
- Did the Ninth Circuit violate 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) when it found the California
Supreme Court objectively unreasonable in holding that California's "catch-all" mitigation
instruction in capital cases is constitutional as applied to post-crime evidence in
mitigation?
Decisions:
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Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Goughnour:
Andrea Natalia Cortina
Deputy Attorney General
San Diego, CA
For Respondent Payton:
Dean R. Gits
Deputy Federal Public Defender
Los Angeles, CA
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Jennifer M. Granholm, Governor of Michigan, et al. v. Eleanor Heald, et al.
No. 03-1116
Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n v. Eleanor Heald, et al.
No. 03-1120
Juanita Swedenburg, et al. v. Edward D. Kelly, Chairman, New York Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, State Liquor Auth., et al.
No. 03-1274
Subject:
Twenty-first Amendment, Imporation of Beverage Alcohol, Commerce Clause, Webb-Kenyon Act
Questions:
Granholm, et al. v. Heald, et al., No. 03-1116
Under state law, the Michigan Liquor Control Commission generally bans out-of-state direct shipment of alcoholic
liquor to consumers' doorsteps, but permits in-state licensed wineries to direct ship to consumers, and out-of-state wineries to import through in-state licensed wholesalers. Out-of-state wineries may also petition the State Liquor Control Commission for an order permitting them to ship wine directly to consumers in the State. Any denial of such a request may be appealed through the State court system. Section 2 of the 21st Amendment to the United States Constitution expressly prohibits importation of alcoholic beverages into any state for delivery or use, in violation of the laws of the State. The Court of Appeals declared Michigan's alcoholic liquor importation law facially unconstitutional in violation of the Commerce Clause. The question presented is:
Does Michigan's regulation of the importation of beverage alcohol under the 21st Amendment facially violate the
Commerce Clause when it permits in-state licensed wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers, but requires out-of-state
wineries to import its products through licensed in-state wholesalers and to sell its products through licensed retailers or request permission of the Liquor Control Commission to bypass this distribution system and ship directly to consumers?
Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n v. Heald, et al., No. 03-1120
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits importation of alcoholic beverages into
any state, for delivery or use therein, in violation of the laws thereof. In the Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C. § 122, Congress exercised its power under the Commerce Clause to impose essentially the same prohibition by federal statute.
Michigan, like many other states, generally prohibits the importation of alcoholic beverages by any unlicensed person.
Michigan law permits licensed in-state wineries to ship wine directly to consumers, but does not, as a matter of right, permit out-of-state wineries (which are not licensed by the state) to do so. An out-of-state entity may locate in Michigan and be licensed as an in-state winery. The Sixth Circuit ruled that the Michigan statute is "facially discriminatory" and struck down the prohibition on importation, allowing Michigan consumers to order and receive wine from out-of-state sources without limitation. The questions presented are:
- Whether the Sixth Circuit erred in ruling (in conflict with a Seventh Circuit decision upholding a similar Indiana statute against the same challenge) that the Twenty-first Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon Act do not authorize Michigan to
enact statutes that prohibit the importation of alcoholic beverages by unlicensed persons, and that the Commerce Clause
bars such statutes.
- Whether the Sixth Circuit erred in ruling (in conflict with a Fourth Circuit decision with respect to a similar North Carolina statute) that the proper remedy for the alleged discrimination was to invalidate the state's control over importation of alcoholic beverages rather than merely strike the offending exception for in-state wineries.
Swedenburg, et al. v. Kelly, et al., No. 03-1274
- Does New York's discriminatory and protectionist prohibition against direct interstate shipment of wine to consumers
violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution; and if so, is it "saved" by the 21st Amendment?
- Does New York's discriminatory and protectionist prohibition against direct interstate shipment of wine to consumers
violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution?
Decisions:
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Counsel of Record
No. 03-1116
For Petitioners Granholm, et al.:
Thomas L. Casey
Solicitor General
Michigan Attorney General's Office
Lansing, MI
For Respondents Heald, et al.:
James A. Tanford
Bloomington, IN
No. 03-1120
For Petitioner Michigan Beer & Wine
Wholesalers Ass'n:
Anthony S. Kogut
Willingham & Cote, P. C.
East Lansing, MI
For Respondents Heald, et al.:
James A. Tanford
Bloomington, IN
No. 03-1274
For Petitioners Swedenburg, et al.:
Clint Bolick
Washington, DC
For Respondents Kelly, et al.:
Miguel A. Estrada
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
Washington, DC
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Ann M. Veneman, Secretary of Agriculture, et al. v. Livestock Marketing, et al.
No. 03-1164
Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc., et al. v. Livestock Marketing, et al.
No. 03-1165
Subject:
Questions:
Veneman, et al. v. Livestock Marketing, et al., No. 03-1164
Whether the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act), 7 U.S.C. 2901 et
seq., and the implementing Beef Promotion and Research Order (Beef Order), 7
C.F.R. Part 1260, violate the First Amendment insofar as they require cattle
producers to pay assessments to fund generic advertising with which they disagree.
Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc., et al. v. Livestock Marketing, et al., No. 03-1165
Whether the Eighth Circuit erred in holding that the Beef Promotion and Research
Act of 1985 ("Beef Act"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901 et seq., and regulations promulgated
thereunder—which impose assessments on beef producers and importers to fund
research, education, and promotional activities carried out by special administrative
bodies created by Congress for the express purpose of furthering important
governmental objectives under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary
of Agriculture—are "unconstitutional and unenforceable.
Decisions:
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Counsel of Record
No. 03-1164
For Petitioners Veneman, et al.:
Theodore Olson
Solicitor General of the United States
Washington, DC
For Respondents Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, et al.:
Ronald A. Parsons, Jr.
Johnson, Heidepriem, Miner,
Marlow & Janklow, LLP
Sioux Falls, SD
Philip C. Olsson
Olsson Frank and Weeda
Washington, DC
No. 03-1165
For Petitioner Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc., et al.
Lorane F. Hebert
Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P.
Washington, DC
For Respondent Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, et al.:
Philip C. Olsson
Olsson Frank and Weeda
Washington, DC
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Richard G. Rousey, et ux. v. Jill R. Jacoway
No. 03-1407
Subject:
Individual Retirement Accounts, Bankruptcy Exemptions
Question:
Should this Court grant certiorari to resolve the threeway
circuit conflict over whether and to what extent
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) are exempt from a
bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E)?
Decisions:
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Parties
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Roderick Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education
No. 02-1672
Subject:
Question:
Decisions:
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Darin L. Muehler, et al. v. Iris Mena
No. 03-1423
Subject:
Search & Seizure, Police Questioning, Authority to Detain
Questions:
- Whether, in light of this Court's repeated holdings that mere police questioning does
not constitute a seizure, the Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that law enforcement officers
who have lawfully detained an individual pursuant to a valid search warrant engage in
an additional, unconstitutional "seizure" if they ask that person questions about
criminal activity without probable cause to believe that the person is or has engaged
in such activity.
- Whether, in light of this Court's ruling in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981),
that a valid search warrant carries with it the implicit authority to detain occupants
while the search is conducted, the Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that a two to three hour
detention of the occupant of a suspected gang safe-house while officers searched for
concealed weapons and other evidence of a gang-related drive-by shooting was
unconstitutional because the occupant was initially detained at gun-point and
handcuffed for the duration of the search.
Decisions:
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Melvin T. Smith v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts
No. 03-8661
Subject:
Double Jeopardy, Successive Prosecutions, Insufficient Evidence
Questions:
- Should this Court grant certiorari to directly review Smith's case and decide the
question that, constrained by the habeas corpus standard of review, it did not reach
in the recent case of Price v. Vincent? That is, whether the double jeopardy clause's
prohibition against successive prosecutions is violated where the judge unequivocally
rules that the defendant is not guilty because the government's evidence is
insufficient but later reverses her finding of not guilty?
- There is a split of opinion among the United States Courts of Appeals and among the
state courts on the question of whether, in similar situations, trial judges violate the
double jeopardy protection against successive prosecution by withdrawing an already granted
verdict of not guilty. Should this Court grant certiorari to clarify its
jurisprudence?
Decisions:
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David Whitfield v. United States
No. 03-1293
Haywood Eudon Hall, aka Don Hall v. United States
No. 03-1294
Subject:
Overt Acts, Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering, Criminal Law
Question:
Is commission of an overt act an element of the crime of
conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 1956(h)?
Decisions:
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Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Whitfield:
David Whitfield, pro se
Coleman, FL
For Petitioner Hall:
Thomas C. Goldstein
Goldstein & Howe, P.C.
Washington, DC
For Respondent United States:
Theodore Olson
Solicitor General of the United States
Washington, DC
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Reginald Shepard v. United States
No. 03-9168
Subject:
Question:
Whether under the amended Armed Career Criminal Act ("the Act"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence is required for anyone convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm who has three or more prior convictions for a "violent felony" or "serious drug offense?"
Decisions:
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Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Shepard:
Linda J. Thompson
Thompson & Thompson, P.C.
Springfield, MA
For Respondent United States:
Theodore Olson
Solicitor General of the United States
Washington, DC
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Dennis Bates, et al. v. Dow Agrosciences LLC
No. 03-388
Subject:
Question:
Decisions:
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City of Sherrill, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, et al.
No. 03-855
Subject:
Question:
Decisions:
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Briefs:
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George J. Tenet, Individually and as Director of Central Intelligence and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, et al., v. John Doe, et ux.
No. 03-1395
Subject:
Question:
Decisions:
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John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al. v. Angel McClary Raich, et al.
No. 03-1454
Subject:
Question:
Decisions:
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Briefs:
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Counsel of Record
For Petitioners Ashcroft, et al.:
Theodore Olson
Solicitor General of the United States
Washington, DC
For Respondents Raich, et al.:
Robert A. Long
http://pview.findlaw.com/view/2585228_1
Washington, DC
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Charles Russell Rhines v. Douglas Weber, Warden
No. 03-9046
Subject:
Question:
Decisions:
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