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Melvin T. Smith v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts
No. 03-8661
Subject:
Double Jeopardy, Successive Prosecutions, Insufficient Evidence
Questions:
- Should this Court grant certiorari to directly review Smith's case and decide the
question that, constrained by the habeas corpus standard of review, it did not reach
in the recent case of Price v. Vincent? That is, whether the double jeopardy clause's
prohibition against successive prosecutions is violated where the judge unequivocally
rules that the defendant is not guilty because the government's evidence is
insufficient but later reverses her finding of not guilty?
- There is a split of opinion among the United States Courts of Appeals and among the
state courts on the question of whether, in similar situations, trial judges violate the
double jeopardy protection against successive prosecution by withdrawing an already granted
verdict of not guilty. Should this Court grant certiorari to clarify its
jurisprudence?
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Monday, December 6
Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al. v. William D. Dotson, et al.
No. 03-287
Subject:
Questions:
This petition arises from one of the many cases considering which prisoner
claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck holds
that a prisoner cannot advance a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where
success on that claim would "necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction
or sentence...unless...the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated." Id. at 487. This is Heck's so-called "favorable termination
requirement."
The Sixth Circuit concluded below that Heck's favorable termination
requirement does not cover claims challenging parole procedures because
success on those claims would not necessarily guarantee speedier release,
but instead would provide only a new parole hearing. This raises the
following questions:
- When a prisoner invokes § 1983 to challenge parole proceedings, does Heck v. Humphrey's favorable termination requirement apply where success
by the prisoner on the claim would result only in a new parole hearing and
not necessarily guarantee earlier release from prison?
- Does a federal court judgment ordering a new parole hearing "necessarily
imply the invalidity of" the decision at the previous parole hearing for
purposes of Heck v. Humphrey?
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Thomas Joe Miller-El v. Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
No. 03-9659
Subject:
Peremptory Challenges, Jury Selection, Racial Discrimination, Arbitrary Fact-finding
Question:
Whether the Court of Appeals—in reinstating on remand from this Court its prior rejection
of petitioner's claim that the prosecution has purposefully excluded African-Americans from
his capital jury in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)—so contravened
this Court's decision and analysis of the evidence in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322
(2003), that "an exercise of this Court's supervisory powers" under Supreme Court Rule
10(a) is required to sustain the protections against invidious discrimination set forth in
Batson and Miller-El and the safeguards against arbitrary fact-finding set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(l).
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Tuesday, December 7
Jennifer M. Granholm, Governor of Michigan, et al. v. Eleanor Heald, et al.
No. 03-1116
Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n v. Eleanor Heald, et al.
No. 03-1120
Juanita Swedenburg, et al. v. Edward D. Kelly, Chairman, New York Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, State Liquor Auth., et al.
No. 03-1274
Subject:
Question:
Does a State's regulatory scheme that permits in-state wineries directly to ship alcohol to consumers but restricts the
ability of out-of-state wineries to do so violate the dormant Commerce Clause in light of Sec. 2 of the 21st Amendment?
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Counsel of Record
No. 03-1116
For Petitioners Granholm, et al.:
Thomas L. Casey
Solicitor General
Michigan Attorney General's Office
Lansing, MI
For Respondents Heald, et al.:
James A. Tanford
Bloomington, IN
No. 03-1120
For Petitioner Michigan Beer & Wine
Wholesalers Ass'n:
Anthony S. Kogut
Willingham & Cote, P. C.
East Lansing, MI
For Respondents Heald, et al.:
James A. Tanford
Bloomington, IN
No. 03-1274
For Petitioners Swedenburg, et al.:
Clint Bolick
Washington, DC
For Respondents Kelly, et al.:
Miguel A. Estrada
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
Washington, DC
For Respondent State of New York:
Caitlin Joan Halligan
Solicitor General
New York Attorney General's Office
New York, NY
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Claude M. Ballard, et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
No. 03-184
Estate of Kanter, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
No. 03-1034
Subject:
Questions:
Ballard, et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 03-184
In this case, the trial was conducted by a Special Trial Judge employed at will by the Tax Court.
The Special Trial Judge was required to create a report of factual and legal findings, but his
original report has never been made available to the parties, the public, or the reviewing Article
III courts. Instead, his superiors on the Tax Court either overruled his factual findings or
persuaded him to change his mind, thus creating a factual finding of tax fraud. This entire
process took place off the record, and came to light only in a subsequent conversation between
two Tax Court judges and a counsel for another party.
The questions presented are:
- Whether this secretive process is consistent with the Due Process Clause or the right to
effective Article III review?
- Whether this secretive process is consistent with 26 U.S.C. § 7482, which provides that
Article III courts must review Tax Court decisions just as they would decisions of a U.S.
district court?
Estate of Kanter, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 03-1034
The Tax Court keeps secret, even from the reviewing courts of appeals, the findings of fact and
credibility judgments of its special trial judges. By law, these trial judges are required to file
reports containing findings of fact and opinion with the Tax Court. Tax Ct. R. 183(b). By law,
these findings of fact "shall be presumed to be correct" and the Tax Court is required to give
"due regard" to the circumstance that the trial judge "had the opportunity to evaluate the
credibility of witnesses." Tax Ct. R. 183(c). Nonetheless, the Tax Court overturns the factual
findings, including the credibility findings, of its trial judges without the record revealing those
findings or that the Tax Court has overturned them. Secret trial judge reports preclude the
courts of appeals from determining whether the Tax Court has complied with the legal
constraints described above. Secret trial judge reports also preclude the courts of appeals from
reviewing a Tax Court decision on the basis of the entire record on which that decision in fact
rests. Federal statutes require that "all reports of the Tax Court * * * shall be public records."
26 U.S.C. § 7461(a).
The questions presented are:
- Whether the due process clause or the governing federal statutes require that the courts of
appeals be able to review Tax Court decisions on the basis of the complete record, including
the trial judge's findings of fact that, by law, the Tax Court must presume to be correct.
- Whether Tax Court Rule 183 requires judges of the Tax Court to uphold findings of fact and
credibility judgments made by their trial judges unless those findings are "clearly
erroneous," as the D.C. Circuit has held, or are those findings and credibility judgments
entitled to no deference at all, as the Seventh Circuit held in this case.
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Wednesday, December 8
Ann M. Veneman, Secretary of Agriculture, et al. v. Livestock Marketing, et al.
No. 03-1164
Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc., et al. v. Livestock Marketing, et al.
No. 03-1165
Subject:
Questions:
Veneman, et al. v. Livestock Marketing, et al., No. 03-1164
Whether the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act), 7 U.S.C. 2901 et
seq., and the implementing Beef Promotion and Research Order (Beef Order), 7
C.F.R. Part 1260, violate the First Amendment insofar as they require cattle
producers to pay assessments to fund generic advertising with which they disagree.
Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc., et al. v. Livestock Marketing, et al., No. 03-1165
Whether the Eighth Circuit erred in holding that the Beef Promotion and Research
Act of 1985 ("Beef Act"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901 et seq., and regulations promulgated
thereunder—which impose assessments on beef producers and importers to fund
research, education, and promotional activities carried out by special administrative
bodies created by Congress for the express purpose of furthering important
governmental objectives under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary
of Agriculture—are "unconstitutional and unenforceable."
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Counsel of Record
For Petitioners Veneman, et al.:
Paul D. Clement
Acting U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC
For Petitioners Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc., et al.
Lorane F. Hebert
Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P.
Washington, DC
For Respondents Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, et al.:
Ronald A. Parsons, Jr.
Johnson, Heidepriem, Miner,
Marlow & Janklow, LLP
Sioux Falls, SD
Philip C. Olsson
Olsson Frank and Weeda
Washington, DC
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Darin L. Muehler, et al. v. Iris Mena
No. 03-1423
Subject:
Search & Seizure, Police Questioning, Authority to Detain
Questions:
- Whether, in light of this Court's repeated holdings that mere police questioning does
not constitute a seizure, the Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that law enforcement officers
who have lawfully detained an individual pursuant to a valid search warrant engage in
an additional, unconstitutional "seizure" if they ask that person questions about
criminal activity without probable cause to believe that the person is or has engaged
in such activity.
- Whether, in light of this Court's ruling in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981),
that a valid search warrant carries with it the implicit authority to detain occupants
while the search is conducted, the Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that a two to three hour
detention of the occupant of a suspected gang safe-house while officers searched for
concealed weapons and other evidence of a gang-related drive-by shooting was
unconstitutional because the occupant was initially detained at gun-point and
handcuffed for the duration of the search.
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